

Association News



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Reports on the Annual Meeting

Annual Meeting In New Orleans Well Attended

A total of 2,842 people attended APSA's annual meeting in New Orleans, August 29-September 1, despite a hurricane threat and a few cancelled airplane flights. This figure compares well with the 1983 meeting in Chicago and is more than 500 above the 1973 New Orleans meeting, as shown in Table 1.

Joseph Cooper of Rice University chaired the Program Committee for the 1985 conference which was responsible for organizing 267 of the over 450 panels at the meeting. APSA's nine Organized Sections assembled 69 panels, an increase

TABLE 2
1985 Annual Meeting
APSA Organized Section Panels

Section	Number of Panels
Conflict Processes	11
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations	9
Law, Courts and Judicial Process	4
Legislative Studies	6
Policy Studies	15
Political Organizations and Parties	2
Presidency Research	3
Public Administration	14
Representation and Electoral Systems	5
Total	69

TABLE 1
Annual Meeting Registration, 1967-85*

1967	2473 (Chicago)
1968	3723 (Washington, D.C.)
1969	4142 (New York)
1970	2397 (Los Angeles)
1971	2732 (Chicago)
1972	3380 (Washington, D.C.)
1973	2312 (New Orleans)
1974	2773 (Chicago)
1975	2478 (San Francisco)
1976	2295 (Chicago)
1977	2624 (Washington, D.C.)
1978	2373 (New York)
1979	2687 (Washington, D.C.)
1980	2745 (Washington, D.C.)
1981	2887 (New York)
1982	2205 (Denver)
1983	2859 (Chicago)
1984	3391 (Washington, D.C.)
1985	2842 (New Orleans)

* 1972-85 figures include exhibitors registered at the meeting, since their fee for booth rental includes the cost of their registration.

over 1984 by one-third due to the growth in the number of Organized Sections since last year.

The average attendance at panels organized by the Program Committee was 20. The Sections with the highest average attendance were Electoral Behavior and Popular Control (whose average attendance was 31); Legislative Processes and Politics (30); Political Thought and Philosophy: Historical Approaches (27); the Practice of Political Science (27); and Political Executives and the Presidency (26).

Among the Organized Sections the groups with the highest average attendance was Political Organizations and Parties (28) which fielded only two panels; Law, Courts and Judicial Process (27); and Conflict Processes (23). The average attendance at Organized Section panels was 18. There was a negative correlation between the number of panels offered by an Organized Section

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and the average attendance at that Section's panels.

Best Attended Panels

The best attended day-time panel at the convention was Political Knowledge for What? Two New Books on the State of the Discipline, with 116 people in attendance. The Roundtable on the Reagan Presidency was the next most popular with 93 in attendance, followed by the Presidential Election of 1984 with an audience of 76.

The fourth best-attended panel with 67 was the Roundtable on Area Studies and Theory Building, followed by the Roundtable on *In Search of France* (66) and the Roundtable on Congressional Committee Research to honor Richard F. Fenno, Jr. (65).

Plenary Sessions

The three plenary sessions, held on each of the three evenings of the conference, drew large audiences. At the first plenary session Program Chair Cooper presided as APSA's awards were presented to outstanding scholars, and Richard F. Fenno, Jr. delivered the Presidential Address, which will appear in an upcoming issue of the *American Political Science Review*. It was estimated that 375 people attended this session.

Fred I. Greenstein of Princeton University chaired the second plenary session on Reform of the American Political System with approximately 175 people in attendance. On the third evening I. M. Destler of the Institute for International Economics presided over a packed house (350 people) to hear Robert S. McNamara, James R. Schlesinger and Brent Scowcroft discuss the problems of and prospects for arms control.

Editor's Note: Full reports of the plenary sessions, Reform of the American Political System and Arms Control: Problems and Prospects, appear below. □

Prospects for Arms Control

Carol Nechemias

Pennsylvania State University,
Capitol Campus

I. M. Destler, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Economics and moderator for the plenary session on "Arms Control: Problems and Prospects," described the panel participants as "doers and thinkers," individuals with high-level governmental experience who now are actively engaged in the enterprise of analyzing current arms control dilemmas. The speakers were indeed illustrious. They included Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and President of the World Bank from 1968-81; James R. Schlesinger, who has held such diverse positions as Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission (1971-73), Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1973), Secretary of Defense (1973-75), and Secretary of the Department of Energy (1977-79); and Lt. General Brent Scowcroft (USAF, ret.), a former assistant to the President for national security affairs (1975-1977), member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (1977-80), and, more recently, chair of a commission established by President Reagan on the MX issue.

All three panelists painted a gloomy picture of the prospects for arms control. Schlesinger argued that public expectations about what arms control can accomplish are exaggerated. In his view arms negotiations do not lead to cuts in defense expenditures, except in a marginal way, or eliminate the threat of nuclear devastation. Moreover, the public seems to believe that the United States alone can, if it wants, achieve progress in managing the arms race; but negotiations involve dialogue between two sovereign powers, the codification of decisions made by independent powers.

What, then, would successful arms talks entail? For Schlesinger, realistic goals consist of stabilizing the military balance between the two superpowers and in-



President Richard F. Fenno, Jr. (right) at the annual meeting with Executive Director Thomas Mann (left) and Michael Preston, Chair of the Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession.

creasing the probability that worthless weapons systems would not be deployed —goals that may fall short of public expectations.

But major obstacles block the achievement of even these more modest aims. Schlesinger singled out several impediments, including a lack of simultaneity in the degree of interest in arms control exhibited by the USA and the USSR in the past 40 years. In the 1970s, for example, the United States was prepared to accept a stand-off under the rubric of detente but the USSR deployed large numbers of missiles with heavy throw-weight. American willingness to accept restraint was not reciprocated. In the 1980s, on the other hand, the Soviet side may be prepared to exercise restraint but the United States appears unprepared for this at the moment. The moods of the two superpowers simply do not coincide.

Another barrier to arms negotiations in-

volves the Reagan administration's reluctance to accept American vulnerability as inevitable. The administration does not want U.S. survival to depend on Soviet forbearance. Schlesinger noted that Western European countries, as well as the USSR, believe in their own vulnerability; only the American historical experience generates this seeming inability to come to terms with this unpleasant reality.

Unable to accept such vulnerability for the U.S., President Reagan hopes to force the USSR to settle with us by engaging in an arms race that the USSR cannot afford to run. But Schlesinger dismissed this approach as an illusion, arguing that Congress has reached the "end of the road" with respect to defense spending; cuts in defense expenditures indicate that we are in no position to run a strategic arms race. Indeed, by drawing down expenditures on conventional weapons the United States is losing part



Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, addresses the plenary session on arms control.

of its deterrent. In Schlesinger's view, the fond belief on the right that America can remake the Soviet defense posture in our preferred image is an illusion.

For Schlesinger, the acceptance of mutual vulnerability constitutes a prerequisite for arms control, the bedrock for the arms talks that took place in the 1970s. The former Defense Secretary argued that Star Wars, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has shaken that foundation. SDI reflects a characteristic American attitude that there must be a technocratic solution to our vulnerability, but Schlesinger saw a number of dangers inherent in this approach.

Although the Reagan administration now advertises and defends SDI as a research effort, largely in response to the reactions of our European allies, Schlesinger characterized this approach as "mighty odd" since it reverses the normal process of conducting technological research and then choosing weapons systems. Policy has preceded technology.

Moreover, SDI has the unique capacity to evoke seemingly conflicting fears in our European allies: the fear of cooptation

into a conflict in which they have no role *and* the fear of abandonment by the United States. With respect to the latter issue, Schlesinger compared SDI to the French Maginot line, which sent a signal that France had no interest in Eastern Europe. In addition, SDI might undermine the British and French independent strategic deterrents. These two countries have an interest in keeping defensive systems at low levels so that their relatively small independent nuclear forces would retain effectiveness. In Schlesinger's view, European governments simply will not support deployment.

He also pointed out that SDI undermines existing strategy, which calls for selective nuclear strikes if the Soviets move westward, an option that becomes impossible if the USSR and the USA have SDI. Ironically, only a massive strike could penetrate the shield of strategic defenses; and we arrive back where we started—with mutual assured destruction (MAD).

The return to Geneva is, in Schlesinger's words, "an unalloyed blessing for the Soviet Union." After two years of Soviet

difficulties in the foreign policy realm, with the downing of the Korean airliner, the walkout at Geneva, heavy-handed involvement in Western European politics, and questions raised about a Soviet role in the attempted assassination of the pope, the USSR now faces the opportunity either to restrain American technology or, more likely, to exploit allied reservations over strategic defense.

Schlesinger argued that public expectations about what arms control can accomplish are exaggerated.

Schlesinger sees little hope of a serious, substantial arms agreement. One possible scenario would involve using SDI as a bargaining chip. While a high price could be extracted from the Soviets, the administration would have to give up hope of American invulnerability. Instead, the United States goes to Geneva with the administration unwilling to use SDI as a carrot and the Congress unwilling to use MX as a stick. As a consequence, the Soviet Union has no incentive to compromise.

Schlesinger argued that the SDI proposal as put forth by the administration fails to address a central contradiction: how offensive weapons can first be drawn down and then SDI deployed, since SDI increases the premium on the numbers and throw-weight of offensive weapons. In other words, if the Soviet Union believes that we are turning toward a generic defense, they will counter that step with a build-up of offensive weapons.

Scowcroft, like Schlesinger, placed considerable emphasis on the problem of inflated public expectations concerning what we can expect to accomplish through arms talks. In his view, the primary aim of negotiations is to "reduce chances that characteristics of the weapons systems will help transform crisis into conflict." What Scowcroft termed "strategic crisis stability" is undermined by the increasing accuracy of missiles and the known location of major targets. While neither side wants a

"bolt from the blue scenario," the problem is that with such weapons a crisis could develop rapidly and make a first strike more plausible.

Scowcroft criticized the freeze movement for its "simplistic" assumption that all change in strategic forces is bad and charged that both liberals and conservatives question the continued utility of deterrence. In Scowcroft's judgment, there are no single, simple solutions to arms control; but there are strategic force structures that would offer less military incentive to attack than the current structure of forces.

With respect to SDI, McNamara said that except for the president and perhaps the secretary of defense no one in government believed the SDI could eliminate our strategic vulnerability. Other SDI advocates had very different notions of its purpose. In fact, Scowcroft wondered what it was, noting that at least five versions of SDI with different goals in mind have received attention from the Reagan administration. Scowcroft thought that the administration had not yet sorted out where it is going; and, while he recognized that a combination of weak offensive systems and strong defensive systems would be stable, he questioned, as had Schlesinger, whether there was "any way to get there from here."

In [Schlesinger's] view negotiations do not lead to cuts in defense expenditures . . . or eliminate the threat of nuclear devastation.

But Scowcroft disagreed with Schlesinger about the meaning of the ABM treaty, arguing that it had not enshrined mutual vulnerability as a principle, but, instead, had represented a tactical decision that the defensive systems that could be developed at that time were not worth deploying. But Soviet research has not stopped in this area, and Scowcroft suggested that the Soviet Union has exhibited considerable enthusiasm for strategic defensive activities—that their

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public comments on this subject do not reflect their true views.

[One] barrier to arms negotiations involves the Reagan administration's reluctance to accept American vulnerability as inevitable.

McNamara emphasized that both the United States and the USSR are driven by deep-seated fears that the other side seeks to achieve a first-strike capacity. The majority of American experts envision a scenario that calls for the Soviet Union launching an attack that would eliminate our Minuteman missiles; the only viable American response, retaliation against Soviet cities, would not be carried out; and the result would be capitulation to Soviet demands.

According to McNamara, this analysis assumes that Soviet leaders are detached from reality. Their actions would be predicated on two shaky premises: (1) that the United States would not launch its missiles when an attack is detected; and (2) that a well-coordinated and massive Soviet attack would work, despite the uncertainties attached to this essentially "untested" enterprise. In McNamara's words, "only a madman would opt for such a gamble, and whatever you think of the Soviets they aren't mad."

Nonetheless, McNamara noted that all arms negotiations must be based on the assumption that the other side seeks to achieve a first-strike capacity. Each side does engage in the vigorous deployment of new weapons systems that threaten the other side's land-based missiles. In the American case, the D-5s now being deployed on our new submarines can destroy Soviet missile silos.

McNamara particularly stressed his concern over SDI's implications, contending that it would stimulate an offensive arms buildup and lead to an American abrogation of the ABM Treaty, an important symbol of detente, within the decade.

All three panel participants had advice to tender to President Reagan. At Geneva, McNamara would use SDI as an opportunity to reduce and reshape strategic forces: the numbers of accurate Soviet land-based missiles to our Minuteman silos would be cut; and the United States would adjust the numbers of D-5 forces yet to be deployed. SDI would be clearly established as a research program, with development prohibited, pending discussion of its strategic implications. In McNamara's view, this approach would allow both sides to emerge as winners.

Schlesinger similarly called on President Reagan to use SDI as a bargaining chip. The Soviet Union would need to provide us with restraint on offense; in return, the United States would exercise restraint on defense. In exchange for rough equality, the United States would reaffirm the ABM Treaty. There would be no visible development and deployment of SDI.

Scowcroft took a somewhat different view. While basically echoing the positions of the other speakers with respect to the need to restructure strategic forces, he was not so pessimistic about the prospects for defensive systems, arguing that the way the administration has proposed moving toward SDI will not work; but that other ways of "getting there from here" might be devised. Scowcroft suggested the introduction of limited defense for certain areas in order to build up confidence between the two superpowers and perhaps pave the way for the adoption of further measures in the future.

McNamara emphasized that both the United States and the USSR are driven by deep-seated fears that the other side seeks to achieve a first-strike capacity.

McNamara noted a peculiar mirror image between the present bargaining situation at Geneva and discussions between

Premier Aleksei Kosygin and President Lyndon Johnson in 1967. At that time the Soviet Union was deploying an ABM system around Moscow and the United States did not know whether Soviet intentions involved deployment across the USSR. In June of 1967, when Kosygin and Johnson met at Glassboro, NJ, Johnson warned the Soviets that America would respond with more offense in order to penetrate Soviet defenses and to maintain deterrence. Kosygin grew angry at the American objections, asserting that defense is moral and offense is immoral. Now the United States is using Kosygin's arguments.

All three panel participants had advice to tender to President Reagan.

Finally, the subject of nuclear proliferation was raised. Schlesinger predicted that if nuclear weapons are used in the next 50 to 100 years, the most likely place will be the third world; hardly a happy prospect, but not the end of human survival. McNamara commented that although nuclear proliferation has been slowed, it cannot be stopped and that the United States and the Soviet Union must discuss how they would react to the use of nuclear weapons by a third party. Scowcroft added that the two superpowers largely agree on attitudes toward nuclear proliferation. □


Reforming the American Political System

Carol Nechemias

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Is change needed in American political structures? The plenary session on

Carol Nechemias reports regularly for *PS* on the plenary sessions of APSA's annual meetings.



Thomas Cronin of Colorado College responds to a question from the audience at the plenary session on political reform.

"Reform of the American Political System" brought together a panel of experts well suited to tackling this issue. The speakers included Lloyd N. Cutler, a member of the Washington, D.C. bar since 1946 and former counsel to President Carter; Barber B. Conable, a former member of the House of Representatives, who served with distinction on the Ways and Means Committee and as Chair of the House Republican Policy Committee; and Colorado College Professor Thomas Cronin, a noted specialist on the American presidency. Presidential scholar Fred I. Greenstein of Princeton University served as moderator.



Former Member of the House Barber Conable (R-NY) warns reform advocates that underlying realities make party government in the U.S. highly improbable.

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While all of the participants acknowledged that American history, beginning with the debate over the creation of the Constitution itself, has witnessed the continuous emergence of reform issues, there was sharp disagreement concerning the need for a current restructuring of the American political system.

Contending that candidates are more independent from party support and party discipline than at any time in American history, Cutler depicted electoral politicians as pulled and hauled by interest groups upon which they depend for money and votes.

Cutler set the stage for the debate by asserting that the reform issue of the 1980s centers on government deadlock or paralysis, as well as difficulties of holding government accountable. In Cutler's view American government is failing to perform its most basic functions—formulation of the budget and national security. To illustrate these points, Cutler focused on the mounting budget deficits and U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. Citing the assessment of the former head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), David Stockman, Cutler emphasized that attempts to resolve the problem of huge government deficits are virtually impossible due to the condition that surrounds it: in Stockman's terms, an "outbreak of government paralysis." Although convinced that the deficit problem will lead to economic ruin, Stockman, faced with the diffusion of power, could only ask, "where will the political consensus and political will come from?"

With respect to American policy toward Nicaragua, Cutler contended that the United States has embraced two distinct approaches—the "Titoizing" posture of Congress and the interventionist position of the Reagan Administration. The result is a policy that is neither fish nor fowl,

that lacks coherence and purposefulness.

Cutler attributed these failures in policy-making to the decline in party cohesion at all levels. Contending that candidates are more independent from party support and party discipline than at any time in American history, Cutler depicted electoral politicians as pulled and hauled by interest groups upon which they depend for money and votes. Members of Congress running for reelection enjoy stunningly high success rates. With the sharp upswing in the occurrence of split-ticket voting, it has become less and less common, especially since World War II, for one party to secure the White House and both houses of Congress. The result, as Cutler noted, is that Benjamin Franklin's quote that "We must all hang together or we shall hang separately" does not apply to Congress.

For Cutler, single-party control of key policymaking institutions (Congress and the presidency) is essential for the proper functioning of government. The rise of divided-party control undermines a president's chances for success in securing the passage of legislative programs. Cutler asserted that steps to enhance party cohesion would represent a return to the first 150 years of our history rather than a shift to a parliamentary system; he claimed to be calling for change at the margins rather than for fundamental changes in the separation of powers.

Would, for example, young conservatives in Congress favor the line-item veto if Walter Mondale were in the White House handling the defense budget?

To refute the charges often leveled at the party government model, Cutler suggested that Congress would retain, as it did in the Teapot Dome scandal, the capacity to check presidential power. He emphasized that the dread results that people predict today if we went to a party government system have not occurred in those American states and par-

liamentary democracies where the model currently holds sway; nor did disaster ensue in the first 150 years of American history, when, according to Cutler, the United States had party government.

Policy changes do occur in our political system, with executive leadership and impending crises playing an important role in generating action, according to Conable.

Conable responded by emphasizing the barriers and impediments to reform which are the underlying realities that may prove insurmountable to party government advocates. He took a critical view of proposals to lengthen the terms of House members, noting that holding fewer elections would not narrow the gap between officials and the electorate. Moreover, he stressed that the "Senate will never vote for an amendment that would allow . . . [House members] to run against them without jeopardizing their seats." Nor would any reforms that require small states to give up their advantages in the electoral system secure passage. From Conable's perspective, party government advocates "can't get there from here."

Nor was Conable convinced that substantial reforms are desirable or necessary. He noted that some changes probably will be adopted to "save ourselves from ourselves." Congress would prefer to work out certain proposals itself, for example, a balanced budget amendment, than open the way for what Conable termed a "devil's workshop"—a Constitutional convention, where it's "hard to identify the Jeffersons and Madisons waiting to come." Overall, however, Conable argued that structural changes, like those flowing from the Budget Reform Act, zero-base budgeting, or sunset laws, are less important than effective leadership. In his view skilled leaders will secure positive results from a flawed structure, but poor leaders cannot do the

same even when faced with well-tuned institutions.

In examining reform proposals, Conable suggested that advocates ask whether they would be in favor of the reforms if the conditions were different. Would, for example, young conservatives in Congress favor the line-item veto if Walter Mondale were in the White House handling the defense budget?

Conable listed a number of alleged flaws of the American political structure: the inability to replace a failed president; the fragmentation of the legislative process and the development of iron triangles; the problems associated with fixed elections; the weakening of political parties; and the overglorification of the people as omniscient. He questioned whether efficiency should be the highest goal of democratic government and whether deadlock and paralysis in fact reign.

Even so, policy changes do occur in our political system, with executive leadership and impending crises playing an important role in generating action, according to Conable. In his view, any alternative from the diffusion of power so characteristic of the American political structure would generate greater polarization.

Overall, Conable characterized the American people as a conservative people with a great deal to conserve, a people who prefer the current system.

Conable further noted that advocates of party government fail to mention that the parliamentary system is not without its flaws: the manipulation of election timing; leaving people with a modest amount of time for electoral campaigns (Conable expressed satisfaction with our long campaign periods); the development of even stronger bureaucracies in parliamentary settings where experts cannot be drawn into the executive; and the downgrading of the people's role to the sole task of creating a majority. With

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respect to this last issue, Conable sees the people—not just interest groups—as a continuing presence in the lives of members of Congress.

Conable summarized his position by suggesting that the American people prefer personal accountability to party accountability. Nor are they drawn to ideology: party dialogue is accommodative, with our system designed to moderation. Overall, Conable characterized the American people as a conservative people with a great deal to conserve, a people who prefer the current system.

Although noting that previous generations of reformers have contributed much to what this country stands for, including the Bill of Rights and women's suffrage, Cronin nonetheless pronounced himself generally opposed to the reforms associated with Cutler and the Committee on the Constitutional System (CCS) which Cutler heads. He attacked the basic premises of the CCS reforms, asserting that the idea that "The party is no longer the instrument that selects our presidents" is overstated. And he wondered what was so terrible about a president settling for a half loaf.

Cronin especially took issue with the notion that the president must speak for us all in foreign policy, because other countries judge our resolve by the degree to which the country backs up presidential policies. Indeed, Cronin expressed his gratitude that we have internal debate on Central America and South Africa, "that what Ronald Reagan says is not the end all and be all of American foreign policy."

"What Ronald Reagan says is not the end all and be all of American foreign policy." — Tom Cronin

In addition, Cronin defended delay, suggesting that a leadership that is sure of what it wants to do must educate the rest of us. The Constitution works well, allowing a Franklin Roosevelt to enact the New Deal but blocking his attempt to pack the Supreme Court, he said.

According to Cronin, whatever deficien-

cies existed in the Carter administration stemmed more from a backlash to Watergate and from the president's lack of political experience and skills than from flaws in the American political system. Carter, after all, was able to work with Congress and, even though the times were tough for a president, accomplish some major objectives, such as the Panama Canal Treaty, the establishment of formal relations with China, and the Camp David accords.

Reagan has opted for current popularity over a place in history by choosing not to exercise his power—his capacity for leadership—on the issue of deficit spending during the past year.

Cronin did favor certain reforms: same-day registration; modification of the electoral college; changes in franking privileges for members of Congress; a two-day period for voting; and free prime time on television for political parties. But he dismissed the line-item veto as a diversion and the six-year term for a president as a major mistake, for it "would give us two more years of an ineffective president and two less of an effective president."

Another CCS reform, having members of Congress serve in the cabinet, was viewed as unnecessary, since informal practice already allows for this, with Senators Laxalt and Baker closer to Ronald Reagan than Donovan and other cabinet officials. As far as ending split-ticket voting and forcing the election of a team ticket goes, Cronin contended that this approach would divide the nation into chunks, with some single-party areas disenfranchised.

Cutler responded to these critiques by reiterating his position that it is virtually impossible to work with the present system, that everyone in Congress has a plan to tackle the deficit but no one has the job to agree on any of them. He compared the situation to a group of doctors

in a terrible argument about what to do while the patient sits by, unhelped. He argued that the goal of creating a more efficient and more powerful government led to the Constitutional convention and that restoring some of the patterns of party government and party cohesion that existed most of the time up to World War II hardly constitutes a call for radical restructuring of the political system.

A dialogue between members of the audience and the panel generated a number of interesting points. James MacGregor Burns of Williams College drew a distinction between the constitutional restructuring called for by Cutler and the minor reforms suggested by Cronin. Larry Berman of the University of California, Davis, asked how President Reagan could be expected to govern with a liberal-moderate Democratic House and a moderate Republican Senate. Forty-nine states may have sent Reagan to the White House, but who should the American public hold accountable?

James David Barber of Duke University argued in agreement with Cronin and Conable that Reagan has opted for current popularity over a place in history by choosing not to exercise his power—his capacity for leadership—on the issue of deficit spending during the past year. Cronin similarly argued that Reagan has the power, that he could veto appropriations bills or send a balanced budget to Congress; but that he prefers to live with the deficits, satisfied with having won victories in other areas, like the weakening of environmental and job safety regulation and the lowering of taxes.

Conable also agreed that the deficit problem could be solved, but thinks that action will be postponed until the government becomes crisis-activated. The 1984 presidential election, after all, involved a president who had submitted increasingly unbalanced budgets; the American people simply remain unconvinced that the deficit is a problem right now. Cutler, however, argued that the deficits represent a growing cancer and that any of the plans under consideration would be better than no plan. From his perspective, by the time the deficit issue is perceived as a crisis-laden situation, the problem will be incurable.

Discussion also centered on the advisability of establishing limits on the terms of representatives and senators. Conable supported the idea, while Cutler argued that members of Congress get better, more able to resist interest groups, the longer they are in office. Cutler further suggested that the presidential election be held two-to-four weeks ahead of the congressional election, so the public could weigh whether to respond to a presidential appeal for support. Cronin, however, responded that the public is likely to vote the other way, given popular cynicism toward politicians and the desire to establish informal checks.

Greenstein probably echoed the musings of many political scientists interested in reform issues, when he noted that "the Almighty should have cloned the political system so we could run experiments." □


Editor's note: The following five reports on roundtables held at the annual meeting were written by the chairpersons of each panel at the request of PS so that non-specialists in these particular subject areas can get a glimpse of developments in parts of the discipline other than their own. In addition, we are attempting to cover more of the substance of the annual meeting especially in those panels where no papers were presented and where there is otherwise no lasting record of the ideas discussed. PS is grateful to the five scholars who accepted the invitation to report on their roundtables, especially given the time constraints posed by an insistent deadline.

The North-South Roundtable

Robert L. Rothstein
Colgate University

Not much more than a decade ago the North-South relationship was widely heralded as a major competitor, or at least a strong supplement, of the East-West relationship as the "relationship of major tension" in the international system. Disagreement with this argument by

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Annual Meeting Program Chair Joseph Cooper of Rice University presides at the Thursday evening plenary session.

realists, conservatives, and a few others was generally dismissed as shortsighted or "ideological." In addition, initially there was a good deal of optimism that new concepts or approaches (for example, interdependence or political economy research) would facilitate understanding and explanation of what seemed to be or might be a major shift in the configuration of power—and perhaps even wealth.

One hardly needs to note that both hopes have been badly disappointed. For a variety of reasons, the North-South relationship did not reflect or generate a power shift, its significance did not come to rival the East-West divide, and the prevailing or emerging concepts and approaches in international relations did not provide much understanding of what happened. Indeed, there is now some feeling that the North-South relationship is not only moribund because of current economic difficulties and ideological hostilities but also is or was a passing aberration of a unique and transitory set of developments. In any case, these arguments and uncertainties suggested the need for a period of stocktaking and reconsideration for those concerned with North-South relations. A distinguished panel was asked to comment about what had happened either in terms of the failed power shift or the failed conceptual apparatus. The panelists were David Baldwin of

Columbia, Jeffrey Hart of Indiana, James Rosenau of Southern California, and Ann Tickner of Holy Cross.

That the panel ended inconclusively and without consensus on the questions to be asked, the concepts to employ, or the policies to advocate should not be surprising. The field is vast, perspectives vary, and instructions from the panel chairman about what to focus on were deliberately loose and indicative. Nevertheless, even with these constraints, it must be said that the lack of agreement among the panelists was quite striking. This was especially true not only in the sense that there was conflict over certain concepts and ideas (for example, the meaning of "structural change") but also in the sense that the panelists frequently seemed to be in entirely different disciplines. In short, one panelist's statement of the problem (or *problematique*) could very well seem to another as not merely wrong but also irrelevant or a misreading of what our panel was "really" about. One might also note that for this observer, who found all of the presentations interesting if disconnected, what was not said was as interesting as what was said.

Rosenau's comments (and a paper that he provided) focused on what he described as a global authority crisis, an empirical concept reflecting degrees of compliance with authoritative directives. This attempt to move away from the nation-state perspective and to place the problems of the North and the South—and North-South—within a common and very general conceptual framework was interesting and provocative. Even if one disagreed with the argument, there was some virtue in being forced to explain why. Thus it seemed to me that, apart from the inevitable ambiguities in attempting to define and apply so macroscopic a perspective, Rosenau had missed two key developments within North-South: first, increasing differentiation within the South, which implicitly suggests the need to explain variations in behavior rather than commonalities; second, while many or most authority structures may be eroding, it is also clear that some such structures—for example, the authority of International Monetary

Fund (IMF) policy packages or the pressures from the United States and the World Bank to adopt an export orientation—are becoming more powerful and more salient for poor and weak states.

The lack of agreement among the panelists was quite striking.

Baldwin in his comments did not attempt to provide a new conceptualization of the North-South relationship but he did provide a provocative and controversial analysis of the conceptual and cognitive “half-truths” (his term) of the past. Some of his points seemed debatable or doubtful to me (for example, about how much leverage the debt problem gives to the Third World; in fact only a limited number can really exercise the power of weakness), but other points were important. Thus his emphasis on the ambiguities of the idea of structural change was well taken, especially because it has become so fashionable to use the term for even conventional shifts in the international division of labor. In addition, Baldwin quite rightly emphasized the extent to which normative predispositions have affected interpretations of the North-South arena—a point that was evident in the panel discussions. It has also been evident, unfortunately, in a reluctance to criticize the Third World or some of the Third World’s proposals in the New International Economic Order (NIEO), although this is both patronizing and counterproductive.

Hart in his presentation largely discussed problems of North-North trade, on the assumption that we can learn from this arena something about the problems of North-South relations. In subsequent remarks he criticized the normative implications of the application of neo-Realism to the North-South relationship (especially the notion that the distribution of power favors the North and *should* continue to do so). He also disagreed with Rosenau’s argument that authority structures had disintegrated, arguing that the disappearance of the NIEO and the dominance of the world capitalist system had

in fact increased coherence—if with some unfortunate effects.

Tickner concentrated on the revival of Realism in the international system, attributing it to the Reagan Administration, rising levels of conflict, and the failure of Southern demands. She also argued that, if Realism were indeed a “real” theory, it should be applicable to North-South relations. She then indicated various ways in which Realism failed as an explanation and interpretation of the North-South arena—despite the somewhat contradictory fact that it was becoming more fashionable in Third World foreign policy behavior. This is an interesting argument, although it raises a number of difficult questions. One very important question is whether Realism is indeed an accurate description of Third World policymaking behavior since such behavior has been largely determined by internal factors and in some cases merely reflects *sauve qui peut* policies by desperate elites. Still, while the argument that Realism is an increasingly inappropriate conceptual model has been made before, Tickner’s discussion of it in current terms was interesting and provocative—eliciting much controversy in the ensuing discussion.

The international system is offering developing countries fewer and more complex alternatives. . . . Dealing with this environment will require much greater domestic policy skills.

The panel covered a wide range of issues from a wide variety of perspectives. In this sense it reflected the uncertainties and tensions that currently trouble the North-South relationship. To this observer, however, there seemed to be several important issues that were either ignored or discussed only in passing. For example, one might argue that insufficient attention was paid to the domestic dimensions of North-South relations.

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North-South obviously involves something more than the structure of the international system. It seems especially important to emphasize this issue at this time, if only because the international system is offering developing countries fewer and more complex alternatives: less aid, more restrictive access to capital and trading markets, a more constraining ideological environment. Dealing with this environment will require much greater domestic policy skills and would of course also diminish the weight of the criticism that problems are primarily due to deficient domestic policy choices.

More attention might also have been devoted by the panel to the changes occurring within the Third World coalition that make unity in the future so problematic. What are the conditions for success of a coalition of the weak? Can they ever be met? Tentative answers might have provided some insight into the question of whether the Third World challenge was merely premature, and thus likely to reemerge again, or whether the challenge was a misguided attempt, reflecting the transitory turbulence of adjusting to the OPEC "shock" and its aftermath, that is unlikely to recur. If the latter, North-South will persist in the decades ahead, but it will likely be a very different kind of North-South relationship. Finally, it might have been useful to speculate about the evolution of the international political economy and its implications for domestic development choices. Put differently, the dialectic between external and internal policy choices is entering a new phase and how to deal with these interacting changes is unclear but crucial. □

Area Studies and Theory-Building in Comparative Politics: A Stocktaking

James A. Bill

University of Texas at Austin

I introduced the roundtable by summarizing two interrelated debates that currently mark much of the discourse about the

state of the field of comparative politics. In the more general debate, one position argues that comparative politics is a field in a state of stagnancy. According to this argument, the field would seem to have lost much of the excitement and momentum that marked its heyday in the 1960s and early 1970s. Important methodological and theoretical work has ground to a halt. The other position challenges this interpretation by indicating that comparative politics is now in the position of institutionalizing its contributions and that new and sophisticated methods and approaches continue to be introduced.

Closely intertwined with this debate is one that focuses upon the role of area studies within the field of comparative theory-building. One side of this controversy has argued that area studies are descriptive, monocontextual, and, as such, have seriously inhibited theory-building. The other position states that area studies are an essential ingredient of the theory-building process since it is here where the reservoir of data about politics is in fact found. The panelists at the roundtable were selected on the basis both of their area experience and their sensitivity to methodology and empirical theory-building. They were also chosen to provide a broad geographic expertise with scholars of Europe, Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the United States serving as panelists. The six discussants collectively represented over 65 research trips to 45 different countries during careers that spanned an average of 25 years.

Gabriel Almond of Stanford University set the tone for the roundtable by presenting a general overview of where comparative political analysis had come during the past few decades. He analyzed the capacity of concepts to travel across areas and the importance of their formulation and reformulation as they encounter different cultural and political contexts. He used as examples what he termed the interest group, patron-client, and political culture-political participation models. Almond argued that much important theoretical work takes place in the "groping and grubbing" that goes on in the early stages of theory-building. In conclusion, he stated that the field of

comparative politics is very much alive today and that it is marked by increasing sophistication and rigor. Professor Almond sharply questioned the position that comparative politics is in a state of malaise.

James Malloy of the University of Pittsburgh discussed the special importance of the field of Latin America within the general field of comparative politics. He indicated that Latin America was perhaps the most productive area in generating concepts and theoretical approaches. In his terms, Latin American scholarship has not only been consuming theory but it has been producing theory as well. As evidence, he used the *dependencia* literature, the role of the state and corporatism, and, most recently, the work being done on regime types and the return to the basic infrastructure of politics. Malloy made the important point that one major reason for this success was the role played by Latin American political scientists themselves who over the years have made critically important contributions both to our understanding of Latin American political processes and to the introduction of new conceptual frameworks and theoretical approaches to the field more generally.

Victor LeVine of Washington University stressed the high hopes that had marked early studies of African political systems. Africanists emphasized studies focusing on the state and state-building. Two decades later, accompanied by the death of optimism surrounding the African political experience, political scientists shifted their emphasis away from the state and toward problems of political crises and conflict. Studies of state-building shifted to the analysis of political disintegration. Today, the field of the comparative politics of Africa is placing more emphasis upon politics at the local level and upon the need to understand "the tree from the roots up." Concern about the processes of "deinstitutionalization" and "departicipation" has slowly moved to one about local politics where the basic building blocks of the political future of Africa seem to be embedded.

James Scott of Yale University began his presentation by calling attention to the increasing need to emphasize problems

and issues that cut across national boundaries. He cited as a case in point the issue of the peasantry in politics. Important problems transcend geographical regions and serve to relate the work of area specialists and comparative theoreticians. Scott argued that an important reason for the advances made by Latin Americanists rested in the existence of a community of discourse in that part of the world. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, such a community is absent. Eight different major language groups and quite distinct historical experiences have hindered such study. As a result, concepts developed for the analysis of Southeast Asian systems did not travel very well. Scott indicated that the concept "legitimacy" had little relevance in Southeast Asia where the state is usually seen as predatory and the locus for "legalized banditry." Part of the essence of studying comparative politics in Southeast Asia, therefore, requires analysis of society's capacity to resist the will of the state. The repertoire of resistance of the peoples of Southeast Asia to their governments is a rich and subtle one.

Many of the theoreticians have lost the capacity to bring into focus the important fine-grained detail while some area specialists only seem to have the capacity to focus narrowly and myopically upon that detail.

Lee Sigelman of the University of Kentucky reported that an in-depth survey of material produced in journals of comparative politics indicated that much of the same work being done in the 1940s and 1950s is still being done today. Parochialism, for example, is still prevalent in the field. Some excitement seems to have been lost. On the other hand, important new work is being done, and there is little doubt that today's comparative political analysts are much more rigorous and scientifically sophisticated than their

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earlier counterparts. The basic problem is that many of the theoreticians have lost the capacity to bring into focus the important fine-grained detail while some area specialists only seem to have the capacity to focus narrowly and myopically upon that detail. The future seems to require the development of approaches which proceed coherently and rigorously with the comparison of limited numbers of political systems. In the process, the American political system must be seen as an important and integral case within the laboratory of study of comparativists. In the end, the consensus of the participants (and audience) attending this roundtable was that comparative politics is alive and well. Led by those who study Latin America, new concepts and ap-

The consensus of the participants (and audience) attending this roundtable was that comparative politics is alive and well.

proaches are constantly being born. The revolution that marked the field in the 1950s and 1960s has quietly institutionalized itself. An important reason for the relatively negative image of comparative politics in the discipline in recent years rests in the self-criticism engaged in by scholars of comparative politics themselves. This self-criticism is in fact a healthy sign and one that promises continuing breakthroughs and transformations in the field in the years ahead.

Area studies and comparative political analysis are inextricably intertwined with one another. The experiences of nation-states across the world provide the material and substance for analysis. Methodological tools and theoretical approaches must have data to organize and interpret. This is the stuff of the area specialist. Increasingly, the tools of the area specialist and the theoretician are found in the kits of the leading scholars of comparative politics. And these scholars must be in continuing communication with one another across countries, cultures, areas, and methodological approaches. □

Internal vs. External Factors in Political Development: An Evaluation of Recent Historical Research

Ronald Rogowski

University of California, Los Angeles

Has recent historical research left any role for *domestic* causation in political development? That subversive question was addressed, and answered, rather differently by David Abraham of Princeton University, Gabriel Almond of Stanford University, David Collier of the University of California, Berkeley, and Peter Katzenstein of Cornell University in a Saturday morning roundtable.

The historiography at issue, I suggested at the outset, seemed to fall into three broad categories: (a) the *dependency* debate and its echoes (including world-systems theory and the bureaucratic-authoritarian model); (b) investigations of the rise, form, and strength of the *modern nation-states*, including those by Tilly, North and Thomas, Skocpol, Anderson, and now Rasler and Thompson; and (c) work on the impact of *trade*, which comprises not only the contributions of Keohane, Krasner, Cameron, Gourevitch, and Katzenstein, but of a small army of recent historians of Imperial and Weimar Germany: Wehler, Winkler, Boehme, Feldman, Eley, Maier, and Abraham. Within these literatures, moreover, the question of external influence in five broad areas of development has emerged as crucial: (1) state strength; (2) (geographical) state size; (3) the strength and intransigence of Right; (4) styles of social and political decision; and (5) susceptibility to authoritarianism.

Almond, summarizing the draft of a large review essay that he had circulated well in advance of the session, denied that the new work represented any radical departure. Such earlier historians and social scientists as Seeley, Hintze, Gerschenkson, Hirschman, Rosenau, Eckstein, and Lijphart—not to mention Almond, Flanagan, and Mundt had amply recognized the importance of external factors, often in a clearer and more convincing way (and here Hintze's work deserved par-

ticular praise) than in some of more recent contributions. At the same time, one must allow that the recent efforts—e.g., those of Tilly, Gourevitch, Katzenstein, Tony Smith, Kahler, and Gereffi—represent “a record of substantial accomplishment, and even greater promise.”

Collier maintained that the popularity of external explanation has peaked, at least so far as Latin American research was concerned. It has now been demonstrated, for example, that the tendency toward “populist” regimes antedated the trade crisis and the growth of import-substituting industry in the 1930s. Dependency theory can hardly explain U.S. development, with its escape from dependency. Whatever inclination toward monocausal external causation might previously have prevailed—and he emphasized that O’Donnell’s work in particular had been far subtler than that—it has now yielded to a more nuanced approach, in which external factors are seen as intervening variables of uncertain weight.

To Katzenstein, the answer to the question of “internal vs. external causation” was obvious: “It is both.” International vulnerability, or more accurately leaders’ *perceptions* of vulnerability, is a variable that can not be ignored; but demonstrably states’ responses to those perceptions has differed, depending on such internal factors as the strength of the traditional Right and the quality of domestic leadership. To him this issue is part of a much larger one, namely that of determinism vs. voluntarism.

Abraham proposed to confine himself to a single, if plainly central, issue of the debate: whether the liberal, capitalist, democratic form of rule can survive only in a congenial international environment. Recent historiography on Imperial and Weimar Germany suggested overwhelmingly that the answer was “yes,” but Abraham has increasingly entertained doubts. Some of the crucial intervening factors can be linked only tenuously to the international environment; and it is hard to distinguish Weimar convincingly from the small-state cases that Peter Katzenstein had studied in the same period.

Why, for example, had a “Red-Green” coalition proven impossible in Germany, particularly in the 1930s? That had to do with workers’ having historically defined themselves as consumers, with the unions’ links to progressive capital, with the continuing strength of the Right and with the Right’s dominance of agriculture; yet none of those factors had really been determined by external events. (Even the strength of the Right, we now see, was no automatic consequence of the tariff decision of 1879.) Similarly, the implacable hostility of the German petite bourgeoisie to labor was crucial, but crucially affected by the split between SPD and KPD and by the strength of Communism in Germany—again, something that no student has been able to tie convincingly even to structural variables, let alone to international factors.

*The students of the state
are “not a school but a
church.”*

Finally, was Weimar Germany’s external situation so very different from that painted by Katzenstein for the smaller European states in the 1920s? Surely Weimar’s leaders all saw the Republic as vulnerable internationally; and the economy depended extremely on trade, exporting fully one-third of industrial production. Why then had the outcome differed so tragically?

In the course of these discussions two important subsidiary issues surfaced. Almond doubted the wisdom of (in Skocpol’s phrase) “bringing the state back in.” Surely a major service of the newer historiography has been to disaggregate the “black box” of the state, to see its actions as products of external and internal factors. Why did some adherents of the newer school want now to re-introduce this “opaque, almost metaphysical entity”? Katzenstein responded that the students of the state are “not a school but a church,” albeit quite a broad one; state-centric analysis is only “a way of framing a question.”

Katzenstein and Abraham both ad-

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dressed political scientists' use of history. For Katzenstein, the lessons of his own research were frankly (a) to bastardize history recklessly, even as Gerschenkron confessedly did; and (b) at all costs to avoid the "dirty work" of the historians, especially archival investigation, and to rely on secondary sources. Abraham found precisely this "bastardization" problematic; he saw in Katzenstein's new book a functionalism that might be difficult to reconcile with the broader European evidence.

Dependency theory is "dead in the water."

Richard Sklar of the University of California, Los Angeles, from the floor, wondered where all of this left us. Dependency theory is "dead in the water"; but what remained? What precise connections between the external and the internal can be specified? I pushed the question further; can anything still be assigned unambiguously to domestic causes? Almond, responding, largely concurred in the negative assessment of dependency theory. That he did not regard internal causation as unimportant can be inferred from other sections of his paper in which he discussed recent work on the domestic sources of foreign policy. But the precise weights to be assigned to internal and external forces are a matter for further historical, and above all for comparative, inquiry. □

Social Protest Movements: What Sociology Can Teach Us

David J. Garrow

City University of New York

The social protest movements roundtable provided an opportunity for a cross-disciplinary exchange between political scientists and sociologists sharing similar research interests. Although the political science literature of the 1968-1978 period witnessed a lively and productive

use of the E. E. Schattschneider tradition of examining nonelectoral forms of political activism and protest, in more recent years sociology has generated a richer and more extensive literature concerning protest movements. As I noted in two preliminary memos to interested colleagues and as several panel members reiterated at the session, the scholarly literatures in the two disciplines have to date developed in relative isolation from each other.

The New Orleans roundtable opened with University of Missouri sociologist J. Craig Jenkins providing an excellent overview of the theoretical and conceptual developments that have occurred in sociology's social movements literature since the early 1970s. A new paradigm, generally known as "resource mobilization" theory, was introduced in 1973 through the works of Anthony Oberschall and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald. Resource mobilization challenged the previously prevailing assumption that protest movements could be explained simply by reference to the psychological needs and "discontent" of mass participants. Instead, "RM" theory presumed that protesters were rational rather than irrational actors, and focused upon the organizations and resources available to potential protest participants. In succeeding years, "RM" theory increasingly split into two competing perspectives, one of which maintained an organizational focus and the other developing what is sometimes called a "political process" emphasis. The first approach increasingly focused on the appearance of "professional social movement organizations," or "SMOs," groups that had fulltime, paid staffs, cultivated "conscience constituencies," possessed largely "paper" memberships, and concentrated upon manipulating the mass media so as to influence public opinion and hopefully generate elite responses and policy changes.

Jenkins, author of the newly published *Politics of Insurgency* (Columbia University Press), explained that the "political process" approach has given primacy to indigenous protest mobilization while also acknowledging the importance of reactive external support from movement

patrons, and said that increasing attention now is being paid to the presence or absence of national political coalitions supportive of movement goals. He stressed that "professional SMOs" deserve more intense study, especially with regard to how this institutionalized social movement industry, like other interest groups, may be fundamentally weakening the roles of political parties. Jenkins also noted that the potential social control effects of external patronage from ostensible movement supporters such as foundations also will receive increased attention from interested sociologists.

University of Washington sociologist Paul Burstein, author of the newly published *Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the U.S. Since the New Deal* (University of Chicago Press), described how his studies of congressional consideration of equal employment legislation had highlighted the importance of multiple components within the American civil rights movement. While direct action protests were essential to convincing the American public that anti-discrimination laws were an important issue, passage of such legislation depended upon the prior crafting of draft statutes and the expertise of the movement's Washington lobbyists. Burstein emphasized that public opinion data indicate that the cumulative effect of the civil rights movement was not to make the American public any more liberal on policy questions involving race, rather that the movement succeeded in convincing the country that long-standing problems had to be moved to the front of the political agenda and acted upon in some fashion.

Political scientist Paul Schumaker of the University of Kansas took polite issue with the suggestions from Jenkins and me that sociology in recent years had generated more and better scholarship on social protest movements than had political science. Schumaker noted the recent work of Clarence Stone and Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb, and argued that the long tradition of "community power" studies offered a theoretical and conceptual rich-

ness equal to any recent developments. He contended that political science has been a more evaluative discipline than sociology, with a greater interest in analyzing the distribution of power in society and the differential policy responses to citizen participation. The conditions for responsiveness, as distinct from the conditions for citizen mobilization, have more productively been the province of political science, Schumaker argued.

While sociology has displayed far too little interest in the social roles of traditional political institutions, political science has been equally remiss in failing to devote sufficient attention to grass roots political activism and non-traditional forms of participation and mobilization.

University of Michigan political scientist Jack L. Walker described how over the past two decades the study of social movements and race relations topics increasingly has belonged to sociology rather than political science. Walker noted how rare it was for relevant, major articles in one discipline, such as his own earlier work with Joel Aberbach, to be cited by scholars in the other discipline, and how political science in recent years has had far fewer young scholars interested in such subjects than has sociology. Walker expressed regret that political scientists generally "have a very static view of the world" and "don't understand change well," or "the roots of change" either. The discipline has suffered from too heavy a focus on institutions alone and from generally looking at too few variables. Political science and sociology "need each other desperately" for analytical progress and improvement, and ought greatly to increase their cross-disciplinary dialogue, Walker stressed.

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Political scientist James Button of the University of Florida agreed with Walker that political science has lagged behind sociology with regard to developing theoretical frameworks that can be used for analyzing the development of protest movements and especially for studying the impact and outcomes of such movements. Button's research on community-level changes in small Southern towns has contrasted the effects of traditional and nontraditional strategies of political participation, and he indicated he had found better theoretical insights in recent social movements studies by sociologists than in the existing political science literature.

Audience members suggested that political science's best recent work on protest had taken place in the comparative field rather than in the American politics literature, but both Button and Walker responded that even in that broader context, political science had concentrated its energy too narrowly on studying traditional but not less traditional political action, and had focused too exclusively on studying some forms of participation—e.g., voting—while neglecting the study of nonparticipation, even non-voting. Panel members noted that the Schattschneider tradition, like much sociological literature but unlike much political science, focused more on conflict than on consensus, and sociologist Jenkins pointed out that many scholars of social movements in his discipline do not accept the liberal democratic ideal that many see as a pervasive presence in much political science scholarship. Paul Burstein noted that sociologists generally disdain the study of political institutions, such as Congress, and Jenkins agreed, noting the widespread lack of interest in that discipline with the role of political parties. Roundtable participants all agreed that while sociology has displayed far too little interest in the social roles of traditional political institutions, political science has been equally remiss in failing to devote sufficient attention to grass-roots political activism and nontraditional forms of participation and mobilization.

Both audience members and the roundtable participants agreed that the session, which easily and productively could

have gone on for another hour or more, represented a valuable opportunity for just the sort of cross-disciplinary exchange of views that all would like to increase. Several participants expressed particular hope that further similar sessions could be arranged in the future, and interest was expressed in seeking the funds and institutional support necessary for convening a special multi-disciplinary conference on social protest movements at which several dozen or so scholars would be able to expand upon the dialogue that was begun in New Orleans. □

The Future of the Congressional Budget Process

James A. Thurber
American University

Are we better off today than we were before passage of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974? How do we judge success and failure of the budget process? What can ten years of budgeting under the act tell us about the future of the congressional budget process? Each of the roundtable participants on "The Future of the Congressional Budget Process," John Ellwood of Dartmouth College, Louis Fisher of the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Allen Schick of the American Enterprise Institute and the University of Maryland, College Park, and Aaron Wildavsky of the University of California at Berkeley offered varying perspectives on these questions.

Ten years after the Budget Act's implementation, few of its original objectives have been met. Budget and appropriations deadlines have been missed. Continuing resolutions and supplemental appropriations are commonplace. There is little control over budget deficits with the country facing a \$200 billion federal deficit and pushing a \$2 trillion debt limit in the next fiscal year. Spending has risen to an all-time high percentage of the Gross National Product. There is more "backdoor" spending (spending that skirts the Appropriations committees)

today than a decade ago. The budget process seems to be too complex and to dominate the congressional calendar to the detriment of authorizations and oversight. In ten years of implementation, no two years of the process created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 have been the same.

Taking all of this evidence into account, Louis Fisher argued that the Budget Act "has been an abject failure." John Ellwood, Allen Schick, and Aaron Wildavsky presented arguments to the contrary. Even given the record of missed deadlines, large deficits, backdoors, deadlock, continuing resolutions and so on, they asserted that the Budget Act has succeeded, although not as the authors of the Act had envisioned. A good budget process should allow Congress to control, manage, and plan public spending and taxation, should it want to do so, and according to Ellwood and Schick it has.

Fisher questioned the defenders of the Budget Act and argued to "let us avoid defending a statute without reference to its benefits and record of performance." Fisher asserted that it is not necessary, or possible, to place the whole blame on the Budget Act. Nor is it necessary to absolve the Budget Act of all responsibility. The Budget Act did make a difference. Initially it did speed up appropriations bills. Absolving the Budget Act leads to contradictory results, according to Fisher. Some try to have it both ways: arguing (1) that the Budget Act is not responsible for the deficits, late appropriations, and other problems because those consequences flow from forces outside the Budget Act, and (2) do not repeal or change the Budget Act because that will jeopardize the single best hope for budget control.

The authors and promoters of the Budget Act had a vast number of goals: to complete appropriations and budget decisions in a timely fashion, to control budget deficits, to limit the growth of federal spending, to improve the way priorities get set among different types of spending, to set congressional fiscal policy, to improve the information and knowledge for budget decisions, to establish a procedure to overcome presidential impoundments, and to compete

more effectively with the president and executive branch in the budget arena. It is hard to claim that the process has been a total success using these objectives as measures of success. However, Ellwood suggested that we judge success and failure of the act using three more realistic and neutral measures: (1) has it allowed or even helped the Congress work its will?; (2) does it provide public officials with enough information so that they know the probable consequences of their decisions?; and (3) does it provide citizens with enough information so that they can hold their representatives accountable should they choose to do so? Ellwood and Schick answered yes to all three questions.

Ten years after the Budget Act's implementation, few of its original objectives have been met.

The provisions of the Budget Act have not prevented the Congress from working its will, although it has not always worked as originally designed. According to Ellwood, "the Act's 'elastic clause' has allowed the process to meet new situations and demands. Thus, when Congress sought to reduce domestic spending it became obvious that a mechanism for each chamber to gain control over committees with jurisdiction over entitlements, appropriated entitlements, and permanents would be required. The 'elastic clause' facilitated the shift of the reconciliation process from the second to the first resolution to take care of this problem."

All of the roundtable participants agreed that the Act provides good information. A major virtue of the Act was that it created the Congressional Budget Office, the Budget Committees, and procedures that provide decisionmakers with enough information so that they know the consequences of their actions. For example, the requirement that members vote on budget spending and revenue aggregates, five-year cost estimates and tax expenditures, and other multi-year projections all contribute to better knowl-

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edge about the probable consequences of their decisions. The process also provides information for voters. "If voters have not reacted to this information by throwing the rascals out," according to Ellwood, "it could be because, while objecting to deficits in principal, they support existing and even increased funding levels on a program basis so long as their taxes do not have to be raised. Moreover they appear willing to live with \$200 billion deficits as long as they can not associate those deficits with a poor economic performance in the short run."

"I think the public wants results, not procedures and mechanisms that obscure accountability."

—Louis Fisher

Fisher addressed the question of the potential consequences of the failure to pass a budget resolution, "members fear that a failure to pass a budget resolution would be interpreted by the public as an abdication of congressional responsibility and control. I think this wildly overstates the public's knowledge of or interest in the passage of budget resolutions—and by that I mean the 'elite' public. I think the public wants results, not procedures and mechanisms that obscure accountability."

Schick argued that the Budget Act has responded remarkably to the major changes in the congressional environment since 1974. The Act has not been amended since 1974, but Schick asserted that in practice, "the Budget Act has been amended, reamended, and reamended in every year since 1975." He suggested that "a budget process is a way of organizing work. It does not lead to any particular decisions. When you have a summit conference with your spouse and you decide to have a budget process, you are simply establishing a way of running something called a household or establishing a relationship between the two of you. If you get divorced, the budget process will respond to that trauma in your household and the new relationship between the

two of you. That is all a budget process is." Schick declared that, "nothing has to stop, if the budget process stops. If a budget resolution is not enacted, Congress can still proceed forward with taxes, authorizations, and spending bills." Schick suggested that the budget process has been different each of its ten years of implementation because Congress has a self-correcting capacity. "Next year we will have a different version of the process and the year after another, and another after that. Self-correction means that we are not at the end of the line for the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act." He urged political scientists to study congressional self-correction in the budget process.

Have we learned something from the past ten years so that future years will be better? Fisher answered with a question, "How many years can we continue saying: Well, the results this year are not acceptable, but we'll tackle things in a big way next year. Next year never comes. By sustaining \$200 billion deficits in relatively good times, what will we do in an economic slowdown or downturn? Raise taxes? Cut social welfare programs? We are exhausting our options for countercyclical policy."

"A budget process is a way of organizing work. It does not lead to any particular decisions."

—Allen Schick

The roundtable participants questioned the quick fixes to the budget process. Fisher argued that, "as we continue to play make-believe about the virtues of the Budget Act, it will be more and more tempting to adopt 'reforms' that I think most of us would regard as offering little relief: biennial budgeting, balanced-budget requirements, and the item veto." Wildavsky questioned the utility of the item veto, "in European social democracies the executive has much stronger weapons than the item veto. Today they spend more than we do. All the item veto will do is raise the size of

the logroll. If you have a spending president, he will use the item veto to increase spending. If you have a cutting president, Congress will simply increase the size of the roll to overcome the veto." Wildavsky supported balanced budget spending limits as a way to decrease the deficit and presented a defense of President Reagan's ability to bring about fundamental change in the budget.

"All the item veto will do is raise the size of the logroll." —Aaron Wildavsky

Fisher concluded that we cannot begin to discover a solution to the problems of the budget process until we admit it has failed. "While it does no good to say that the problem is the problem, admitting that the present solution is not a solution is a necessary first step in developing better controls," Fisher noted. Is it irresponsible to criticize the existing process without having an alternative in mind? Fisher suggested that, "we did not think that way in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The system existing at that time was considered fundamentally flawed and in need of change. We did not look for excuses, justifications, or rationalizations, which has been our habit in recent years."

The roundtable closed with a brief discussion about whether we are better off going back to the pre-1974 decentralized budgeting process. Most of the participants argued that we are better off with the Act. Wildavsky reminded the audience that "to agree on everything is going to cause delay, heartburn, hostility, anger, contempt and all the other things that are written about in today's papers about the budget process. My understanding is this: in the past quarter of a century and with increasing speed, we have witnessed the polarization of political elites in this country and to a lesser degree, a polarization of political attitudes in the country as a whole." This polarization causes disruption and delay in the budgetary process. The roundtable concluded with the fact that it is the fundamental change in Congress and in

American politics as a whole that is the major challenge to the future of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, not flaws in the Act itself. □

R. Taylor Cole Honored on 80th Birthday

Colleagues and former students gathered at a dinner honoring R. Taylor Cole, President of the Association in 1959, on the occasion of his 80th birthday, on Friday evening during the annual meeting in New Orleans.

Allan Kornberg, chair of the political science department at Duke University, which sponsored the dinner, presided over the dinner ceremonies. Among those attending were Gabriel Almond (APSA President in 1966), Samuel Barnes, Lucian Pye, and Emmette S. Redford (APSA President in 1961).

Thomas E. Mann, Executive Director of APSA, read a resolution of recognition that was unanimously passed by the APSA Council:

Message to Professor R. Taylor Cole

Dear Taylor:

The officers and Council of the American Political Science Association send you our



R. Taylor Cole at the dinner in his honor at the annual meeting.

Association News

warmest congratulations on the occasion of your 80th birthday. Your active participation in the life of the Association, particularly as editor of the *Review* and as our 54th president, helped steer us through a critical time of transition and expansion in the 1950s. You took bold steps to establish peer review as editorial policy for the *APSR*, and to initiate thoughtful discussions of methodology and social science research in its pages. You were the first Association president elected from a southern university. We salute you for these and other milestones in your distinguished career as scholar, educator, and colleague. We thank you for strengthening the profession of political science as well as its national Association. And we wish you a happy evening among the many friends who have gathered to honor you here in New Orleans.

Sincerely,

Richard F. Fenno
President

Thomas E. Mann
Executive Director



Jewel L. Prestage of Southern University congratulates Twiley W. Barker, Jr., of the University of Illinois, Chicago, as Charles O. Jones looks on. Barker was honored by the Committee on the Status of Blacks for his contributions to the discipline.

Twiley Barker and Wally Miles Honored by APSA Committee

Twiley W. Barker, Jr. of the University of Illinois, Chicago, and E. Wally Miles of San Diego State University were honored by the APSA Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession at the APSA's Annual Meeting in New Orleans. Plaques were bestowed on these two scholars at a reception on Friday, August 30, at the New Orleans Hilton.

Barker and Miles were recognized for their contributions to the discipline of political science and their efforts to improve the status of black Americans in the profession. The committee began honoring political scientists seven years ago. The purpose of this honor is to commend those who have advanced the interests of black political scientists and have distinguished themselves as scholars and teachers. Michael Preston, University of Illinois, is the present chair of the Committee.

Twiley Barker is a professor of political science at the University of Illinois, Chicago. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 1955. He has also taught at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and Southern University.

Barker was a member of the Council of



E. Wally Miles of San Diego State University was honored by the Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession at the annual meeting.

the APSA from 1982-84, as well as a member of the Administrative Committee during that time. Other APSA activities include: member of the Program Committee (Public Law & Judiciary Section); member of the first Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession; and member of the Edward S. Corwin Awards Committee. He has also served on a number of panels at annual meetings.

Barker's published books include *Freedom, Courts, Politics: Studies in Civil Liberties and Civil Liberties and the Constitution: Cases and Commentaries*, both co-authored with Lucius J. Barker. Articles he has published have appeared in *PS*, *National Civic Review*, *Illinois Democratic Forum*, and *The Quarterly Review of Higher Education Among Negroes*, to name just a few.

Barker's awards and honors include: the General Education Board Fellowship, the Silver Circle Award for Teaching Excellence, and the Danforth Prize for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching.

E. Wally Miles, the other honoree, is currently a professor of political science at San Diego State University. After earning his Ph.D. in government from Indiana University in 1962, Miles continued his studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where he focused on the behavioral approach to the study of law and politics.

Miles' involvement in the profession has been extensive. He has served on the APSA Executive Council and several of the Association's standing and special committees. APSA committee assignments have included the following: Administrative, Executive Director Search, Task Force on the Future of the Profession, and two terms as chair of the Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession. Miles has also been a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Politics* and the *Western Political Quarterly*, and served as Public Law and Judicial Politics Chair for the 1984 APSA meeting.

Miles co-authored *Vital Issues of the Constitution* and has contributed sections to other books. He has also written a number of scholarly papers and articles

on law-related subjects; and has done research in the areas of federal court staffing and civil rights at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas.

Miles is currently Board Chairman of the San Diego Urban League. Under his leadership, the San Diego Urban League recently opened a multi-million-dollar computer training facility in its continuing effort to improve employment opportunities for disadvantaged minorities and poor people of all races.


This year's honorees will join the ranks of other prominent political scientists recognized by the Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession: Charles V. Hamilton, Columbia University; Jewel L. Prestage, Southern University; Samuel Cook, Dillard University; Charles Harris, Howard University; Robert Martin, Howard University; Clarence Mitchell, former chief lobbyist for the NAACP; Evron Kirkpatrick, former APSA Executive Director; Lucius Barker, Washington University; Matthew Holden, University of Virginia; and Earl M. Lewis, Trinity University. □

F. Chris Garcia Commended at Annual Meeting

F. Chris Garcia of the University of New Mexico was noted by the APSA Committee on the Status of Chicanos in the Profession at the APSA's Annual Meeting in New Orleans. He received a plaque at a reception on Thursday, August 29, at the New Orleans Hilton. Garcia was honored for his contributions to the discipline of political science and for his efforts to improve the status of Chicanos in the profession. The purpose of this honor is to commend persons who have advanced the interests of Chicano political scientists and have distinguished themselves as scholars and teachers.

Presently, in addition to being Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Garcia is also a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Davis, in 1972. He has also taught at California State University,

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F. Chris Garcia received special commendation at the annual meeting from the Committee on the Status of Chicanos in the Profession.

Indiana University, and the University of California, Davis.

Garcia is presently serving on the APSA Executive Council. He has also been a member of the Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education and a member of the Committee on the Status of Chicanos in the Profession. He has served as Vice-President and President of the Western Political Science Association. Garcia is also a member of the International Political Science Association, Phi Kappa Phi, Pi Sigma Alpha, and the Council of Colleges of Arts and Sciences (where he serves on the Board of Directors and was chair of the Recruitment and Membership Committee from 1983-85).

Garcia's published books include: *New Mexico Government* with co-editor Paul Hain, and *The Chicano Political Experience* with co-author Rudolph de la Garza. In addition he has published many articles and book reviews, which have appeared in the *New Mexico Historical Review*, *Electoral Studies: An International Jour-*

nal, the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Teacher Education*, and the *Journal of Politics*. Garcia's awards and honors include: the New Mexico Humanities Council Newspaper Project Award, the Outstanding Alumni Award from Valley High School in Albuquerque and the Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship.

This is the first year that the Committee on the Status of Chicanos in the Profession has honored an outstanding colleague. However, according to the chair of the committee, this will become a yearly activity at the annual meeting. Isidro Ortiz, University of California-Santa Barbara, is the present chair of the committee. □

Wolin, Sundquist, Wood Receive APSA Awards

Sheldon Wolin of Princeton University, James L. Sundquist of the Brookings Institution, Robert C. Wood of Wesleyan University, and Jim Lehrer and Robert MacNeil of the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour were among those honored at APSA's 81st annual meeting.

Wolin received the Benjamin E. Lippincott Award for his *Politics and Vision*. The Lippincott Award was established to



Barry R. Posen of Princeton University is congratulated by Barbara Hinckley of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, as he receives the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for the best book published in the U.S. during 1984 on government, politics or international affairs.



Fred R. Dallmayr of the University of Notre Dame presents the Benjamin E. Lippincott Award to Sheldon Wolin (right) of Princeton University for his book *Politics and Vision*.

recognize a work of exceptional quality by a living political theorist that is "still considered significant after a time span of at least fifteen years since the original date of publication." In reading the citation on behalf of the selection committee, Fred R. Dallmayr of the University of Notre Dame said that Wolin is an "epical" theorist. His book, said Dallmayr, "offered a beacon of light to students of politics disaffected with the scientism of modernity, yet unwilling or unable to abandon modern aspirations in favor of a celebration of antiquity."

Virginia Gray of the University of Minnesota presented the Charles E. Merriam



James L. Sundquist (right) of the Brookings Institution is awarded the Charles E. Merriam Award by Virginia Gray of the University of Minnesota for his significant contribution to the art of government through the application of social science research.



Alan Rosenthal of the Eagleton Institute of Politics presents the Hubert H. Humphrey Award for notable public service by a political scientist to Robert C. Wood (left) of Wesleyan University.

Award to James Sundquist "whose published work and career represents a significant contribution to the art of government through the application of social science research." On behalf of the selection committee Gray said that Sundquist "exemplifies the hope of Charles Merriam that we combine the scientific study of politics with a prudent concern for public policy and the practice of democratic government."

The Hubert H. Humphrey Award was presented to Robert Wood in recognition of "notable public service by a political scientist." Alan Rosenthal of the Eagleton Institute of Politics of Rutgers University in presenting the award noted that "not only does Robert Wood richly



Dale Rogers Marshall of the University of California, Davis, and David H. Tabb (center) and Rufus P. Browning of San Francisco State University were awarded both the Gladys M. Kammerer Award and the Ralph J. Bunche Award for their book *Protest Is Not Enough*.

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Jim Lehrer (left) and Robert MacNeil received the Carey McWilliams Award, which is presented each year to honor a major journalistic contribution to our understanding of politics.

deserve this award, but his career serves as an example for all of us." Rosenthal said that Wood "has a keen sense" of what the public interest is and "a real feeling for what it requires."

Jim Lehrer and Robert MacNeil were honored for their MacNeil/Lehrer News-hour with the Carey McWilliams Award, which is presented each year to honor "a major journalistic contribution to our understanding of politics." Michael Malbin of the American Enterprise Institute read the citation on behalf of the committee, noting that "MacNeil and Lehrer have transformed our ideas about what good journalism can do, enriching . . . our understanding of the political world around us." For political scientists "watching the show is like taking a daily field trip."



Bruce W. Jentleson of the University of California, Davis, chats with his dissertation advisor Peter Katzenstein of Cornell University at the annual meeting where Jentleson was awarded the Harold D. Lasswell Award for the best dissertation in 1983 or 1984 in the field of policy studies.

For the first time two APSA awards were accorded to the same scholars. Rufus P. Browning and David H. Tabb of San Francisco State University and Dale Rogers Marshall of the University of California, Davis, were given the Ralph J. Bunche Award and the Gladys M. Kammerer Award for their book *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics* (University of California Press). The Kammerer Award recognized the best political science publication in 1984 in the field of U.S. national policy, while the Bunche Award identified the best scholarly work in political science published in 1983 or 1984 "which explores the phenomenon of ethnic and cultural pluralism."

Other award winners were:

Barry R. Posen, Princeton University, was accorded the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, for the best book published in the U.S. during 1984 on government, politics or international affairs, for *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Cornell University Press.

Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, and Michael Wallerstein, University of California, Los Angeles, shared the Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award, for the best paper presented at the 1984 Annual Meeting. Walker won for his paper "Three Modes of Political Mobilization" and Wallerstein for "The Micro-Foundations of Corporatism: Formal Theory and Comparative Analysis."

Other dissertation award winners were:

David Pion-Berlin, Ohio State University, the Gabriel A. Almond Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 or 1984 in the field of comparative politics, for *Ideas as Predictors: A Comparative Study of Coercion in Peru and Argentina*, submitted by the University of Denver; dissertation chair, John F. McCamant.

Kim Lane Scheppelle, University of Michigan, the Edward S. Corwin Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 and 1984 in the field of public law, for *Legal Secrets: Common-Law Rules and the*

Social Distribution of Knowledge, submitted by the University of Chicago; dissertation chair, James Coleman.

Bruce W. Jentleson, University of Chicago, Davis, the Harold D. Lasswell Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 and 1984 in the field of policy studies, for *Pipeline Politics: The Alliance and Domestic Politics of American Economic Coercion Against the Soviet Union*, submitted by Cornell University; dissertation chair, Peter Katzenstein.

Wayne A. Edisis, the Helen Dwight Reid Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 and 1984 in the field of international relations, law and politics, for *The Hidden Agenda: Negotiations for the Generalized System of Preferences*, submitted by Brandeis University; dissertation chair, Robert O. Keohane.

John Zaller, Princeton University, the E. E. Schattschneider Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 and 1984 in the field of American government, for *The Role of Elites in Shaping Public Opinion*, submitted by the University of California, Berkeley; dissertation chair, Nelson W. Polsby.

Ruth Grant, University of Chicago, and Ian Shapiro, Yale University, the Leo Strauss Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 and 1984 in the field of political philosophy. Grant won for her thesis *John Locke's Liberalism*, submitted by the University of Chicago; dissertation chair, Joseph Cropsey. Shapiro won for *Individual Rights in Modern Liberal Thought: A Realist Account*, submitted by Yale University, dissertation chair, Douglas W. Rae.

Donald W. Chisholm, University of California, Berkeley, the Leonard D. White Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 and 1984 in the field of public administration, including broadly related problems of policy formation and administrative theory, for *Informal Organization and the Problem of Coordination*, submitted by the University of California, Berkeley; dissertation chair, Martin Landau. □

Bert Rockman Wins Neustadt Book Award

Bert A. Rockman is the winner of the Presidency Research Section's first Richard E. Neustadt Book Award. Rockman was honored at the section's business meeting at APSA's annual meeting for his work, *The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American System* (Praeger, 1984).

The Neustadt Book Award Committee was composed of Martha J. Kumar of Towson State University, Norman C. Thomas of the University of Cincinnati, and Thomas E. Cronin (Chair) of Colorado College. In selecting Rockman's work as the best book about the American presidency published in 1984, the committee surveyed over 30 works written on the presidency and unanimously agreed that Rockman's was the superior contribution. □

Job Picture Brightest in Ten Years

The ratio of the number of jobs listed at the annual meeting placement service to the number of applicants seeking positions was the highest in a decade. There were 179 jobs listed at the annual meeting and 300 applications for positions (see Table 1).

In contrast, in 1977, the low point of the decade, there were only 142 openings for 570 applicants. Thus, one's chances of obtaining a position in 1985 were almost three times greater than in 1977. Because the placement service caters primarily to new Ph.D.s and listings are mainly for junior appointments, these figures reflect the job prospects primarily for those entering the profession. Sixty-four percent of the job classifications were for assistant professors, 20% for associate professors, 5% for professors, 4% for instructors, 1% for chairs and 6% for non-teaching jobs.

TABLE 1
Annual Meeting Job Placement Service
Number of Applications, Employers and Jobs, 1975-1985

Year	Location	No. of Applications	No. of Employers	No. of Jobs
1985	New Orleans, LA	300	116	179
1984	Washington, DC	465	84	127
1983	Chicago, IL	350	79	120
1982	Denver, CO	229	76	121
1981	New York, NY	340	96	131
1980	Washington, DC	326	86	112
1979	Washington, DC	427	106	134
1978	New York, NY	450	96	124
1977	Washington, DC	570	107	142
1976	Chicago, IL	518	95	154
1975	San Francisco, CA	512	91	142

TABLE 2
Demand and Supply of Applicants and Jobs,
by Percent and by Category

Applicants	Categories	Jobs
27%	American Government and Politics	26%
12	Public Policy	11
7	Public Administration and Organizational Behavior	17
4	Methodology	6
14	Political Theory	4
18	International Relations	15
18	Comparative Politics	16
—	Non-teaching (jobs only)	5

Table 2 shows that there was a fairly even match between applicants and jobs by field with certain notable exceptions. For example, whereas 17% of the jobs listed were in the field of public administration, only 7% of the applicants listed that field. In the political theory field, on the other hand, there were 14% applicants and only 4% of jobs listed in that field. □

Participation by Women Dropped in 1985

Martin Gruberg
 University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh

Another year, another convention, one having a theme of political change. The

change for women was not, however, one for the better at this year's political science convention. Though there was a record number and percentage of women as section heads, the rates of female chairpersons, papergivers and discussants all declined (Table 1).

As usual, when women served as section heads or chairpersons, other women were more likely to be selected as program participants. However, this was not always true. Nor was it always the case that male gatekeepers passed over women for participation roles. The section on Political Thought: Analytical and Critical Approaches, for example, headed by a male, had one of the best male-female ratios.

As indicated in my 1984 report, my annual assessments will have to include

TABLE 1

	Total	Women	%		Total	Women	%
Section Heads				Chairpersons			
1985	23	8	34.8	1985	260	51	19.6
1984	20	6	30.0	1984	215	44	20.5
1983	24	7	29.2	1983	196	35	17.9
1982	19	5	26.3	1982	163	22	13.5
1981	16	3	18.8	1981	137	16	11.7
1980	18	3	16.7	1980	139	29	20.9
Paper Givers				Discussants			
1985	966	149	15.4	1985	320	52	16.3
1984	804	142	17.7	1984	294	58	19.7
1983	730	120	17.4	1983	272	50	18.4
1982	557	109	19.6	1982	184	28	15.2
1981	520	98	18.8	1981	161	28	17.4
1980	453	99	21.9	1980	160	19	11.9

from now on, not only the sections organized by the Program Committee, but also the panels sponsored by the APSA organized sections and committees. Except for the panels sponsored by

the Committee on the Status of Women, the latter sets of panels, all organized by males, had fewer female participants than did the Program Committee's panels (Table 2).

TABLE 2

		Total	Women	%
Chairpersons				
Organized Sections and Committees	1984	47	10	21.3
	1985	73	15	20.5
Grand Total	1984	262	54	20.6
	1985	333	66	19.8
Paper Givers				
Organized Sections	1984	158	24	15.2
	1985	255	37	14.5
Committees	1984	21	8	39.0
	1985	45	11	24.4
Grand Total	1984	983	174	17.7
	1985	1266	197	15.6
Discussants				
Organized Sections	1984	46	6	13.0
	1985	56	12	21.4
Committees	1984	7	0	0
	1985	7	1	14.3
Grand Total	1984	347	64	18.4
	1985	383	65	17.0

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The eight sections organized by women had women as 34.1% of the chairpersons (30 of 88), 17.4% of the paper givers (58 of 334), and 15.0% of the discussants (21 of 140). (That is, 38.9% of the women paper givers in the Convention's Program-Committee-organized panels were found in the sections organized by women as were 40.4% of the female discussants. In women-chaired panels were to be found 37.0% of the female paper givers at the meeting and 19.2% of the female discussants. Women-chaired panels had 29.0% female paper givers and 16.4% female discussants.)

There were no women on the panels of the two evening plenary sessions. The six speakers and both chairs were males.

The sections with the strongest female representation were: Political Thought; Historical Approaches; Political Thought; Analytical and Critical Approaches; Public Opinion and Political Psychology; Political Participation, Political Power, and the Politics of Disadvantaged Groups; Public Administration and Organization Theory; Policy Studies; Legislative Studies; and the Status of Women in the Profession.

The sections with the weakest female representation were those on Positive Political Theory; Empirical Theory and Research Methods; Electoral Behavior and Popular Control; Legislative Process and Politics; International Relations: Conflict Analysis and National Security; International Relations: Hierarchy and Dependence in the International System; The Practice of Political Science; Conflict Processes; and Law, Courts, and Judicial Process.

1985's lopsided stag panels included those on Approval Voting; Macro and Micro Perspectives; Political Crises, Violence and Terrorism; Party Realignment and Partisan Change; Processes of Partisan Transformation; Political Ambition and Electoral Politics; the Roundtable on Social Protest Movements; the Roundtable in Honor of Charles Hyneman; Studies in the Institutionalized Presidency; the Roundtable on the Reagan Presidency; the Roundtable on Humanities Teaching and Research by Political

Scientists; Formal Models of War; Executive Branch Influences and Constraints Upon the Federal Courts; Marketplace Strategies in Public Policy; Environmental and Energy Policy Problems; Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy; and Urban Political Culture Under Fiscal Austerity. (The latter had a female chair but seven male paper givers and two male discussants.)

Panels overwhelmingly female included Political Participation of Women in the Third World; State Theories, Development and Women; Gender and Political Orientations; The Interdependence of Gender, Race and Class in American Politics; A Global Look at the Political and Economic Roles of Women; Reconsidering Some Myths of Public Administration; and Subtle and Not So Subtle Discrimination Against Women in Academic Institutions.

I recommend that the Association's Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession undertake a study of why the participation rate for women at the New Orleans meeting declined from that manifested in recent years. □

Council Reaffirms Commitment to Sullivan Principles

At its August 28 meeting APSA's governing body reaffirmed its commitment to the Sullivan principles. APSA's policy is not to invest in any company doing business in South Africa unless that company adheres to the Sullivan principles. Under these principles companies must not engage in racial discrimination in their employment practices and must work to end apartheid in South Africa.

The question arose at the Council meeting during a review of APSA investments that include mutual funds whose portfolios may include companies that do business in South Africa. Samuel P. Huntington, Nannerl Keohane and Donna E. Shalala prepared the following resolution,

which was approved unanimously by the Council:

The APSA Council deplores the *apartheid* politics of the government of South Africa, and requests the Board of Trustees of the Trust and Development Fund as a matter of urgency to review the investment policies of our currently held mutual funds.

In light of the long-standing APSA policy concerning the Sullivan Principles we recommend that this review be carried forward with an eye towards moving out of any fund that includes in its portfolio companies that do not adhere to these Principles, or firms that do business directly with the government of South Africa. We urge the Board to seek out alternative high-performance funds that meet these criteria.

Small Grant Program

In other action the Council increased the annual budget of the Small Grant Program to \$12,000 from \$10,000 and added an additional representative from a small college to the Research Support Committee which distributes the grants. President-elect Aaron Wildavsky announced that his appointee would be Huey Perry of Southern University.

Under the program grants up to \$1,500 are awarded to APSA members from non-Ph.D.-granting institutions as well as to those not affiliated with an academic institution for the purpose of assisting research. Fundable activities include such activities as travel to archives or to conduct interviews, purchase of datasets, and administration and coding of interviews. In 1985, the first year of the program, a total of ten grants were made. (See *PS*, Summer 1985, pp. 623-624.)

Editor's Note: See the Appendix of this issue of PS for complete Council minutes. □

Samuel Huntington Elected President-Elect

Samuel P. Huntington, Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and director of the Center for International Affairs

at Harvard University, has been elected to serve as president-elect of APSA for 1985-86 and will assume the office of president in 1986-87.

Huntington was elected by acclamation at the Annual Business Meeting on August 31 in New Orleans along with the other nominees selected by the Nominating Committee for APSA offices and Council positions.

Theodore J. Lowi, Cornell University, Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis, and Donald R. Matthews, University of Washington, were elected vice-presidents of APSA for 1985-86. Myron Weiner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was elected secretary for 1985-86 and Helen Ingram, University of Arizona, was elected treasurer for the two-year term, 1985-87.

The eight new members of the 16-member Council elected to serve a two-year term (1985-87) are: John W. Kingdon, University of Michigan; Stephen D. Krasner, Stanford University; Paula D. McClain, Arizona State University; Karen O'Connor, Emory University; Carole Pateman, University of Sydney; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., University of Rochester; Kenneth Shepsle, Washington University; and Nancy H. Zingale, College of St. Thomas. □

Nominating Committee Seeks Suggestions

The Nominating Committee, headed by Nelson W. Polsby of the University of California, Berkeley, seeks suggestions for nominees to APSA offices.

The Committee will make nominations for eight Council positions, as well as the offices of secretary, vice presidents (three positions) and president-elect.

The members of the nominating committee are:

James A. Caporaso, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80209.

Charles Hamilton, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027.

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John Kessel, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210.

Kathleen McGinnis, Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Washington, DC 20017.

Nelson W. Polsby, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 202 Junipero Serra Blvd., Stanford, CA 94305.


Barbara Sinclair, Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521. □

Journal Discounts Offered to APSA Members

Members of APSA should watch the mails for their listing of journals offered at discounted rates. The listing, with subscription coupons, will be mailed to all individual members in late September. □

Salisbury Named Book Review Editor of the *APSR*

Samuel C. Patterson, incoming managing editor of the *American Political Science Review*, has named Robert H. Salisbury book review editor.



Robert Salisbury of Washington University in St. Louis is new book review editor of the *APSR*.

Salisbury is Sydney W. Souers Professor of American Government at Washington University in St. Louis where he has spent most of his career and has served as chairman of the Department of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Public Affairs. He has been a visiting lecturer at 27 universities in the United States and abroad.

In addition to the eight books he has published, Salisbury has written numerous articles for the major journals in the profession. His most recent publication for the March 1984 issue of *APSR*, "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," extended his path breaking work on interest groups. He has also written on the politics of education, urban politics, public policy analysis, governmental reorganization, elections, political parties, and Congress.

Salisbury is a former vice president of APSA and has served on its Council. He has been both president and program chair of the Midwest Political Science Association. He has served on the editorial board of the *American Journal of Political Science* and the *American Politics Quarterly*.

Active in civic affairs, Salisbury has been a consultant for the Office of Economic Opportunity, the U.S. Office of Education, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. He has also served as a member of the St. Louis County Charter Commission and the Missouri Commission on Local Government.

PS asked Salisbury to comment on his plans for the book review section of the *Review*, and his response, intended as an open letter to the discipline, follows:

As book review editor of the *APSR*, building on the splendid work of my predecessors, I hope to do several things. First, I want to make the review section as interesting and provocative to read as possible so that political scientists will find intellectual stimulation there as well as information and evaluation of newly published work. Whenever appropriate I will commission essays from established scholars and ask them to review substantive areas of inquiry and traditions of scholarship as well as to assess the current book or books under review. At

the same time, I expect to publish a considerable number of quite brief review notes so that readers may be as fully aware as possible of what is available.

I would like to include for review and commentary some books that are outside the normal range of political scientists' vision but that nevertheless seem to me of relevance to the work we do. I hope to review books in history and other social sciences and, whenever I can obtain good advice concerning worthwhile material, in other fields as well. In this regard I would urge everyone to recommend to me books that you believe the readers of *APSR* should know about. Publishers will not routinely send us books that appear to lie outside a rather narrow definition of our discipline, so it will take a sustained collective effort to enlarge our coverage.

The number of books published annually which potentially come within the purview of political scientists is enormous. The daily tasks involved in managing the immense flow of paper generated by the review process will take such energy that experiments will be limited. There will surely be mistakes of omission and commission. My judgments will often be flawed. I do hope and expect to hear from APSA members with suggestions and criticisms, and I will try to be both responsive and flexible. Certainly, I will be enormously dependent on the help and counsel of the profession.

—Robert H. Salisbury □

APSA Publishes Code of Ethics

A Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science has been published by the Association's Committee on Professional Ethics, Rights and Freedoms to provide a statement of ethical principles for political scientists.

The booklet contains the 1968 code of professional standards written by the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities, the statement of professional ethics written by the American Association of University Professors and endorsed by APSA, the grievance

procedures for approaching the Committee on Professional Ethics, Rights and Freedoms, advisory opinions to date of the Committee on Professional Ethics and APSA guidelines for employment opportunities, a statement of principles on academic freedom and tenure, and regulations governing research on human subjects.

The booklet costs \$3, including postage; bulk rates are also available. To order, send request and check to APSA Publications, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036. □

Corrections for 1985 Membership Directory

The following corrections have been requested for the 1985 APSA Membership Directory. The office regrets the errors. For information on obtaining the Directory, see the order form at the back of this issue of *PS*.

The corrections are as follows:

GATI, CHARLES: His primary affiliation is Professor, Department of Political Science, Union College, Schenectady, NY 12308. Phone: (518) 370-6224.

MITTELMAN, JAMES H.: The following information should be deleted from his listing—the street address, Convent Ave. at 138th St. and the initial "C." after his name.

RIEGER, FRANK: His address should read —Am Schwarzen Berge 33c, 3300 Braunschweig, Lower Saxony, West Germany. Am Govt/Pol should be added to his fields of interest. □

Global Understanding Project Offers Instructional Units

The political science curriculum offers distinct courses for American, comparative and international politics. The largest proportion of students majoring in political science concentrate in American politics. And, an American politics course is often the only political science offering for a majority of undergraduates who are

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not our majors. How can these students be introduced to a comparative or international perspective on political institutions and policy questions?

A few years ago, the Annenberg/CPB Project supported the Global Understanding Project to address this question. The Global Understanding Project, conducted by National Public Radio, produced two audio/print courses in comparative politics and also a series of instructional units designed specifically for courses in American politics and public policy. The boxed insert that accompanies this notice describes components of the comparative politics courses, entitled: Contemporary Western Europe and The Challenge of China and Japan.

The instructional units designed as special course supplements have print and audio components. Each unit provides a comparative or international perspective on a topic taught in American politics or public policy courses. A unit can be used singly or in combination with other units. The units are suitable for the introductory American politics course or for specialized upper division courses in public policy or political processes.

The print component of the unit is a compact monograph. The title and author(s) of each monograph are:

The Administrative State in Industrialized Democracies by Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, and Bert A. Rockman, University of Pittsburgh.

Coordinating International Economic Strategy by Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, University of California, Berkeley.

Comparative Political Parties by William Crotty, Northwestern University.

The Welfare State in Hard Times by Hugh Hecllo, Harvard University.

Preserving Peace: The Difficult Choice of International Security by George H. Quester, University of Maryland.

The monograph is complemented by an audio cassette that dramatizes issues and the analyses of institutions. The audio magazine features interviews with political leaders, scholars and citizens.

The audio cassette was prepared specifically for this project by National Public Radio and is of broadcast quality.

The topics of the units and the authors of the monographs were selected on the basis of discussions at a series of regional meetings with political scientists and the NPR project staff. The meetings were attended by the following faculty:

In Boston: Robert Art, Walter Burnham, Ethel Klein, Robert Putnam, Harvey Sapolsky.

In San Francisco: John Chubb, Harry Harding, Kay Lawson, Kenneth Waltz, Raymond Wolfinger.

In Washington, D.C.: Karl Cerny, Milton Cummings, Jr., Hugh Hecllo, Neil Kerwin, George Questor.

In Chicago: Lee Anderson, Doris Graber, Lloyd Rudolph, John Sullivan.

The American Political Science Association is publishing and distributing the units. The units are \$4.50 each. When 20 or more units are ordered for use in a course, the instructor receives the audio cassette at no additional charge. The units can be ordered directly from APSA. □

Organization of Power To Be Program Theme for 1986 Annual Meeting

The function of the annual meeting is, among other things, to allow colleagues to put on display, for collegial advice, criticism, and instruction, the varied forms of research and writing that, in our highly individualistic discipline, we take seriously. The 1986 meeting will serve that function fully. APSA programs can never be turned into Procrustean beds. But colleagues are particularly encouraged to consider how their work may be related seriously to the 1986 program theme, "The Organization of Power," predicated on the view that there is a fundamental coherence in the political phenomenon and a potential intellectual coherence in the analysis of the political phenomenon.

"Politics" as a fundamental human activity, to adapt language from Walton

1986 Dissertation Awards

Department chairs are invited to nominate outstanding dissertations that have been completed and accepted during the 1984 or 1985 calendar years. The award categories and a list of the 1985 winners are listed in this issue of *PS*. Departments may nominate only *one* person for each award. An engraved certificate and a cash award of \$250 will be presented to the winners at the 1986 Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. Dissertations will be returned to the department following the Meeting.

Nomination letters from the department chair and a copy of the dissertation should be sent by **January 15, 1986** to: Dissertation Awards, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Hamilton, "is not [simply] the televised soapbox or the [search] for votes, but [in the] Aristotelian tradition . . . the usages and traditions, the arrangements and policies, by which [the human species] is governed, and through which [human beings]—usurping the function of the gods—attempt to shape destiny." In a quite different intellectual tradition, Masao Maruyama expresses politics as "the organization of control by man over man." If human beings seek to shape destiny, they must seek to control the collectivities in which they operate, lest divergent actions vitiate that which they seek.

Therefore, the theme of the *organization* of power not only refers to formal structures (see Loomis and Ingraham below on the power of organization in that sense), *but to an active process*. Human striving to achieve, stabilize and exercise power implies the counter-efforts of other human beings to undermine, evade, overthrow or insulate themselves from existing or potential arrangements of power. (This drives us to consider, among other things, the micro-political level—the individual—and the connection to the formal structure, including values about authority (cf. Eckstein below) and the acquisition and holding of political beliefs (some of which are referred to in the Sigel note below).)

The program design is, in form, essentially parallel to that which has been used for several years. Section 6 (Eckstein, below) provides for new attention to

power and authority in non-governmental entities, here designated "social organizations" or "private governments." Section 18 (Politics and Economics) gives a more express intellectual recognition of what John Maurice Clark once called "the interpenetration of politics and economics." Section 19 (see Hamilton, below) provides a vehicle for special attention to the welfare state.

The section chairs have, and will exercise, wide latitude to interpret the specific relevance of the program theme to their sections and to decide when to adopt a different approach altogether. We will all try our best to be fair and to be seen as such. But we do not promise to be inert. The program chair may also exercise the discretion, in consultation with section chairs, to create a very small number of panels or workshops on matters of major interest that cannot easily be accommodated within a single section. The program chair would be particularly interested in proposals regarding:

(a) reconsideration of the relevance of political studies occurring in anthropology, sociology, and history—which appear to have less place on our agendas now than they did 20 years ago;

(b) studies in literature and politics, if conceived on a broad integrative basis, with a deep foundation in literature and in politics;

(c) studies in the "popular cultures," rather than in the "high cultures," as expressions of ideas of authority, rebellion,

etc. and their consequences for political systems;

(d) relevance of archaeological and other evidence about ancient societies, notably Greece and Rome, for the reconstruction of our knowledge of their politics, and of the relevance of their politics to contemporary ideas of empirical theory;

(e) conceptualization, and notably empirical examination, of the fundamental resources of control in society, e.g., force, money, information;

(f) the application of concepts and theories from modern political science to major historical experience or to problems that arise mainly in other disciplines, e.g., (1) the decision to initiate the Columbian expeditions as a forum for testing ideas about political decision-making and policy innovation; (2) the political element in the making of rules about property that are fundamental to "the market"; or (3) the imaginary treatment that would have been entailed if cost-benefit analysis had been applied to the problem of whether to adopt the Kansas-Nebraska Act;

(g) consideration of the relationship between changes in analytical technique and the capacity to answer a question, as manifest in particular fields of political analysis over the course of modern political science;

(h) methodological work referring to the problems of *discovering and identifying* research questions worthy of the time and intellectual attention of grown men and women, in contrast to the already-recognized-as-important issues of *verification*, and other problems in the methodology of "soft" research; and

(i) the anticipation or forecasting, on the basis of carefully ordered thought and data, of major scientific or technological developments, e.g., human gene therapy, space colonization, etc.

If there are such panels or workshops, they will be very few and must be screened more severely than if they were proposed for the regular sections. Proposals will be the more welcome if their makers are able (a) to provide preliminary drafts, of fairly short length, based upon work in progress, rather than work that

they intend to initiate; (b) to show clearly whether the problem is a *new* problem in political science or whether there is a line of implicit or explicit theory bearing on it; (c) to show whether the problem requires data or merely the most careful thought possible; (d) to show, if data are required, whether the data needed are qualitative or quantitative and that the best effort has been expended; and (e) to show that the problem, as stated, deserves to be regarded as significant from the viewpoint that the maker of the proposal will sustain. Such preliminary drafts should be in a state capable of completion before July of 1986 and should include prior formulations of the problem in political science as a discipline, command of the relevant literatures, sources of data, etc.

The Program Chair particularly invites suggestions as to the impact, if any, of the defense-oriented environment since 1945 upon the domestic politics of the United States, and/or other countries, particularly as it may suggest any re-examination of the Lasswellian concept of the "garrison state."

Policies and Deadlines

Paper proposals and offers to appear as discussants or panel chairpersons should be submitted as early as possible. The deadline for receipt of submissions is December 1, 1985. Proposals for whole panels are welcome, but persons with suggestions for panels should get their requests in early.

Please write directly to the appropriate section chairperson listed below. More general inquiries or suggestions may be addressed to:

- Matthew Holden, Jr., Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, 232 Cabell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22905; (804) 924-3422.
- Norinne Hessman, Convention Coordinator, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20036; (202) 483-2512.

Prospective participants should be aware of two APSA Council policies which will be enforced by the Association: (1) ac-

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ceptance of a proposal by the Program Committee obligates you to preregister (with appropriate fee) prior to June 1, 1986. If you fail to preregister, you will not be listed in the final program; (2) you may serve on no more than two panels of the official program. However, you may serve as a paper author on only one panel of the official program. This rule applies only to participation on the panels organized by the Program Committee and does not affect participation on panels organized by "unaffiliated groups."

You may offer to participate in panels in several sections. However, if you receive invitations for more than one paper presentation, you may only accept one of them. You may not appear on more than two official panels, irrespective of the nature of the participation. If you do apply to several sections, please inform each section chairperson that this is a multiple application. Also, in that case, please notify the other section chairpersons as soon as you have accepted an invitation for participation in another section.

Section 1. Positive Political Theory.

Russell M. Hardin, Committee on Public Policy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637.

Positive Political Theory uses formal models to explain political outcomes and to analyze normative constraints on political action. The models are most commonly set theoretic, game theoretic, or microeconomic equilibrium models that are generally based on the assumption of narrow rationality, or self interest. Much of the work in the field has had surprising, often negative, implications for our understanding of politics. Major insights in the field include the difficulties of aggregating individual into collective choices and of motivating individuals to collective action. Such results have remade both our positive and our normative views of political activity.

Panels in the Positive Political Theory Section will be diverse in their substantive and theoretical focuses. While the final structure of panels will depend on the best submitted papers, I expect to arrange panels on recent experimental work, critical assessments of the theo-

retical foundations of the field, the effects of dynamic or over-time considerations on the models, and applications of the models to normative theory. I also expect to see panels on the formal analysis of institutions, groups, elections, and preference formation.

Section 2. Empirical Theory and Research Methods. Steven J. Rosenstone, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 3532 Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520.

Panels in this section will be concerned with the development and use of innovative methodological techniques to address substantive political problems. I am particularly interested in the following topics: (1) models and methods of survey measurement (including question wording and order, measurement error, non-response, scale effects, instrument effects, and survey design); (2) ecological inference and the analysis of historical data; (3) the analysis of data sets built from pooling cross-sectional survey data gathered at different moments in time; (4) problems that arise in practice when employing simultaneous equations methods; (5) simulation and artificial intelligence; and (6) new software. I will welcome paper proposals and suggestions for panels in any of these and related areas. I will be most receptive to papers that will be reporting innovative methodological work rather than applying existing techniques.

Section 3. Political Thought and Philosophy: Historical Approaches. Alan Gilbert, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80208.

The 1986 program theme, "The Organization of Power," will be used to provide for a broad representation of current work in political theory. The selection of papers will not, by any means, be governed by that theme alone. The present design is to emphasize three main sorts of panels, whether cast within that theme or within other conceptions deemed significant to political theorists, that would include reinterpretations of, or controversies about, how to interpret major past and contemporary theorists.

(1) The first sort of proposals would be for panels and papers involving philosophical arguments, recapitulating or modifying those of leading theorists, that have relevance for debates about the nature of democracy, political participation and individuality. (For instance, papers along these lines might provide insight into the challenges to the subjection of women and their impact on conceptions of the self and political deliberation.)

(2) I would be interested in proposals which clarify the classes of liberals and Marxians. Such proposals might, for example, reassess arguments about the effects of war and revolution on regime structure and human well-being or appraise modern claims about basic historical change, moral advance and decay.

(3) I would also look for panels suggesting new or resuscitated ways in which modern arguments and debates might be seen in comparison to those of the ancients.

Lively, pointed discussion is more likely if panels remain small and papers focus on the same or closely linked issues. I prefer panels composed of two papers and one discussant or roundtables among scholars who have previously written on a subject to larger, more loosely defined panels. (I also want to provide opportunity for newer voices in the discipline, possibly including advanced graduate students.) Such arrangements will, I hope, encourage audience participation.

Section 4. Analytical and Critical Theory. Scarlett G. Graham, Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University, 1208 18th Avenue-South, Nashville, TN 37212.

The organization of power has for centuries provided the principal framework for sorting and classifying political regimes. Modern explorations of the origins of power have linked society and government into still other frameworks of analysis, going beyond the notion of formal power to that of effective power. Power relationships important for political analysis have been found in property, class structure, and even language and the structure of communication. Recent

concern with the crisis of authority raises serious questions as to how adequately the relationship between formal and effective power, between regimes and the societies they govern, is understood. Critical theorists have raised these same questions in rather different terms for an even longer time.

Panels and papers that help to clarify and sharpen discourse on power as a concept, an analytical device, or a tool of social criticism will be especially appropriate to the overall theme of the program. The many indirect problems of substance and method that result from a focus on power are equally appropriate topics. The general program theme should be viewed as an opportunity for analytical and critical theorists presenting their work to share a common point of departure, not as an unduly restrictive limitation on the diversity of concerns to be considered or approaches to be employed.

Section 5. The Practice of Political Science. Jewel L. Prestage, Dean, School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs, Southern University, Southern Branch Post Office, Baton Rouge, LA 70813.

The panels in this section will be directed toward issues, problems, concerns and patterns in the growth and development of the profession and the discipline as well as the contemporary state of the profession and the discipline. In addition, work focusing on the future of the profession is being solicited. The aim is to include the broadest possible range of scholarly endeavors which address the general area of "the practice of political science" within the context of the program theme, "The Organization of Power."

Among other things, proposals will be considered for:

(1) Examination of the social structure of political science as a discipline, and the evidence as to whether the structure of the discipline inhibits either opportunities for some members of the profession more than others or the examination of some social status questions more than others. Clearly, this involves a set of questions now under some discussion,

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both as to the status of women and as to the status of several ethnic minorities, among them Afro-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.

(2) The various ways in which education in political science is absorbed in professional activity in government or the private sector, outside the academic system, and the extent to which habits of mind or bodies of knowledge and skills acquired in the graduate world of political science serve well or ill. The section chair will particularly be interested in proposals and comments from colleagues who, having undertaken careers in the private sector, nonetheless, retain an active intellectual connection with the discipline.

(3) Active political participation as a learning experience that yields a systematic or substantial re-interpretation of political science and politics, e.g., when political scientists have been deeply engaged in activities and responsibilities outside the political science setting, what have they deemed themselves to learn? Political scientists are recurrently involved in activities as various as street-level community organizing, political campaign management, campaigning for and being elected to a variety of offices from local school board to the Senate, etc. What has their experienced-based learning (a variety of participant-observation, so to speak) had to do with the reformulation of ideas in scholarship?

(4) Are there "continuing education" models for use in the study of politics, by political scientists, and in the mastery of pedagogy? Is there a staleness problem inherent in our work, as there may be in many other lines of work, and what are constructive means, free of self-flagellation, that we may use to help overcome the staleness problem?

(5) What are the significant changes taking place in the demography, economics, politics, and administration of higher education that significantly affect (a) our capacity for effective teaching, (b) our capacity for research and publication of findings, and (c) our occupational prospects?

(6) If an adult education course were designed for elective politicians and journalists, reflecting contemporary political

science, what should it contain? If an adult education course were designed for political scientists, reflecting what contemporary journalists and elective politicians know, what should it contain?

These are provisional questions subject to refinement. The section chair will welcome proposals for papers and volunteers to act as commentators or panel chairs. The section chair will also welcome additional proposals, beyond the range of the items mentioned above, provided they are submitted on a timely basis.

Section 6. Power, Authority, and Private Governments. Harry Eckstein, School of Social Sciences, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, CA 92717.

Panels in this section will be concerned with the nature, determinants, and consequences of governance in social organizations and institutions, such as families, schools and universities, workplaces, trade unions, and political parties.

Examples of pertinent issues are: (1) whether such organizations and institutions can, through their internal authority relations, form participatory attitudes and behavior; (2) whether the internal structures and processes of political parties (or other organizations) can provide effective training in political leadership; (3) whether problems of maintaining order and discipline in formative organizations (e.g., schools) tend to prevent effective attainment of their goals (education). Many other issues are appropriate, as are papers on whether the governance of "private" organizations in fact has significant consequences for political life; and on general organization theory. Also appropriate are papers that mainly describe the governance of "private organizations."

The papers may be case studies, comparative research, largely speculative essays, or critical analyses of existing literature on governance in the institutions and organizations listed above.

Section 7. Comparative Politics: Public Policies and Policy Making. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Department of Political

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Science, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130.

Papers given in these panels might compare policies across national political boundaries, or across policy fields, or both. Papers comparing policy or policy implementation in subnational units will be welcome if they also meet one of the above criteria. Papers which emphasize the temporal dimension as a distinct variable are also solicited if they overlap with the basic criteria. The panels will of course reflect the diverse methodologies which are employed, but I would favor their having a primary geo-political and policy area focus, i.e., a panel on U.S.-West European economic policy comparisons, one on comparing environment policies in developing countries, etc.

A focus on conceptual problems encountered in the identification, classification and analysis of policies across national institutions and policy fields might be an effective way to explore how the organization of power creates both problems and opportunities for research in this field. Are decisions in similar policy fields handled differently in more "corporatist" or "pluralist" systems, in those with stronger or weaker bureaucracies? How is policy conceptualization developing in other countries and languages, does this lead to somewhat different priorities as to selection of research topics? Is one observer's policy another's non-policy, and how do they explain their reasons?

Some varieties of policy comparisons which might be especially welcome because we have seen rather few of them are: (1) policy comparisons between American states and smaller developed countries; (2) comparisons of taxation, transport and agriculture policies; (3) analyses and critiques of the comparative policy implementation literature; (4) international agencies and their influence on convergence or divergence in national policies; (5) organized professions and public policies; (6) the impact of social program cutbacks; (7) attempts to measure degrees of policy impact, success or failure.

Section 8. Comparative Politics: Publics, Leaders, and Institutions. Alberta Sbragia, Department of Political Science,

University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; (412) 624-3725.

This section is well suited to a wide-ranging exploration of the organization of power in diverse societies. Proposals for papers or panels that relate the structure and behavior of mass publics, diverse types of public and quasi-public elites, and a wide variety of institutions— and especially the linkages between them—to the organization of power at both the national and subnational level will be given priority.

Proposals which integrate two or three of the section's themes are particularly desirable, such as studies of elite-mass linkages, the structuring of conventional and unconventional participation, interactions between mass publics and elites, institutional responses, links between institutions and elite composition or transformation, and studies of elite recruitment and institutional stability. Also welcome are proposals concerned with linkages between national and subnational elites and institutions. Both historical and contemporary cases are acceptable.

I prefer proposals which provide explicit comparisons between nations or across levels and time periods. If they do not fall in that category, they should deal with issues of broad theoretical concern. While papers focusing exclusively on the United States are inappropriate, papers which include the United States in a comparative study are suitable. Finally, proposals for a panel that would synthesize and evaluate the status of what we know about the links between publics, leaders, and institutions would be extremely welcome.

Section 9. Comparative Politics: Process of Development and Change in Contemporary Societies. Edmund J. Keller, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106.

The panels in this section will focus on the organization, location, and execution of political power in contemporary societies. While participants are encouraged to be comparative in their analyses, rigorously analytic case studies are also appropriate. Panels are not restricted to any

particular area of the world or any specific type of regime. Presenters are strongly encouraged to engage in cross-national and cross-regional comparisons, but this is not obligatory.

Political economists, who have recently rediscovered the importance of the "State" in politics and public policy in both post-industrial and Third World countries, have raised some interesting questions about the nature of power in contemporary societies; about the relative power of different groups or classes in certain situations; and about the consequences which grow out of the uses and abuses of political power. I am sure there are many other questions relating to this theme which shed light on the general issue of "Development and Change in Contemporary Societies."

Volunteers for chairing panels or acting as discussants, as well as for presenting papers, are welcome.

Section 10. Public Opinion and Political Psychology. Roberta S. Sigel, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.

Priority will be given to panels and papers that relate topics of public opinion and/or political psychology to the 1986 APSA theme, "The Organization of Power." Panels on public opinion consequently should strive to explore questions which relate perceptions of power, authority and conceptions of legitimacy to the structure and expression of public opinion while panels on political psychology might stress the origins of such attitudes as well as their overt manifestations. Emphasis on change—either secular or individual—in the mass public's orientations are particularly welcome. So are papers reporting on new or "resurrected" methodologies for investigating the topics.

Among potential topics could be: Public Opinions (including mass media, agenda setting, schema and structures of public opinions, manipulation of it, including propaganda); Political Socialization (especially changes over the life course, gender-related attitudes, etc.); and Political Psychology (including the development of attitudes, such as trust, preju-

dice, alienation, etc. and their relation to personality).

Panel topics will be selected on the basis of importance to research in the area, especially those which point to new directions in substance and/or methodology. Panel organizers should bend every effort to select papers that lend coherence to each panel.

Section 11. Political Parties and Elections. William Crotty, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201.

The theme of the 1986 APSA annual meeting is the organization of power. I am particularly interested in theoretical and conceptual approaches to the organization of political and social power as it relates to intermediary institutions of political representation and mobilization. I would be interested in, in addition to longitudinal, cross-national or cross-sectional comparative works; empirical data-based studies; and innovative research approaches. I would like to see studies relating to organization of power for the politically less well-off and, secondly, as it relates to areas that are just beginning to receive extended academic conceptual and empirical development. Among these I would include: PACs and political finance and its impact; organization of minority, women and gay political groups and the distribution of political rewards; organization and political change; the redefinition of political coalitions; the mass media and its import on political organization and political expression; the institutionalization of power in mass and legislative parties and the redefinition of their roles; and the value of party and campaign management as they affect the organization of power and the distribution of influence at all levels. All serious academic proposals for papers, roundtables and panels which fall within these bounds will be given consideration. In general, I would like to see papers that reconceptualize approaches to the more traditional areas of concern; that help develop or reach out to new areas; and/or that add something of substance to our cumulative understanding. There should

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be a sense of intellectual excitement to our efforts.

Section 12. Interests, Groups, and Social Movements. Burdett Loomis, Department of Political Science, 504 Blake Hall, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045.

"The Organization of Power" is a theme that cuts close to the quick in the study of political interests and social movements. First, in a Bentleysque world, interest group activities constituted all we needed to know about how power was organized. To an extent, the pluralistic implications of these ideas continue to hold sway in the study of American politics.

From a second, more contemporary perspective, we see the organization of increasing numbers of interests, ranging from political action committees to neighborhood groups to corporate "public affairs" divisions. In addition, loosely-structured, but often potent, social movements frequently emerge as powerful forces.

Paper proposals and panel topics will be welcomed across the breadth of scholarship on interests, groups, and social movements. The program theme suggests two general categories as possible guides in framing these submissions. First, I would encourage research and writing that examine the *impact of organized power*. Studies of PACs, activist movements, corporate actions, or foreign lobbying are only a few examples of the kinds of work that might be done. The scope of such research could vary from the smallest governmental units to the broadest comparative frameworks.

Second, I would prevail upon scholars to make proposals that emphasize the *power of organization* (or the lack thereof). Given the richness of incentive theories and social mobilization perspectives, we could profit from a series of papers, panels, and roundtables that discuss this central element in harnessing the political strength of societal forces.

Although most papers and topics would fall into one of these broad categories, I welcome as wide a range of submissions as possible. In particular, suggestions for

roundtables or other panel formats would be appreciated.

Section 13. Public Law and Judicial Politics. Harold J. Spaeth, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

The theme of the 1986 program, the organization of power, suggests that panels and papers that deal with subjects such as the following would be especially appropriate. (1) Formal and informal relationships among judges on a given court, within a judicial system, or between judges and other participants in the judicial process (attorneys, clerks, administrative agencies and officials, police, prosecutors, jurors, etc.). (2) Formal and informal relationships between courts or administrative tribunals. (3) Analyses of the impact of judicial activity on litigants, other courts, administrative agencies, or affected publics. (4) Court management studies. (5) Judicial administration: structure, personnel, processing cases, proposals for reform. (6) Various aspects of administrative law. These subjects stress endogenous and/or exogenous linkages between or among courts, judges, participants in the judicial process on the one hand and the environment in which they function on the other.

A roundtable or two which focuses on an aspect of judicial management or administration about which there is much discussion and debate may prove to be attractive: e.g., the litigation explosion: can courts cope? Are the justices really overworked? Any suggestions in this regard will be appreciated.

I recognize that the foregoing matters encompass a relatively limited portion of the subfield—a portion, moreover, in which most judicial scholars do little, if any research. Although preference will be accorded proposals compatible with the theme of the 1986 program, I shall adopt a catholic approach and will therefore welcome papers and proposals on all other topics as well.

Section 14. Legislative Process and Politics. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Department of Political Science, University of Houston, University Park, Houston, TX 77004.

Certainly the organization of power has been a significant focus of research, if not a major one, in the study of legislative process and politics. This is especially true in the study of the internal workings of legislative institutions—committees, leadership, and party organizations and in the study of Congress.

Less systematic attention has been given to the organization of power between legislative institutions and other competitors for policy influence, e.g., executives, courts, bureaucracies. Similarly, less systematic attention has been paid to the variety of ways in which state legislatures organize power. Accordingly, I would encourage papers and panels which address these aspects of the problem.

This does not mean that I intend to neglect areas in which a substantial research base addressing the 1986 theme already exists. Such a substantial base exists with regard to legislative elections, decision making, committees, leadership, representation, and reform. In these aspects, it seems strategic to urge that proposals on these topics which stress historical analysis of the organization of power, rather than being limited to examining the topic within a narrow time frame.

Section 15. Political Executives.

Stephen J. Wayne, Department of Political Science, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052.

Consistent with the theme, the organization of power, I would like to encourage the section on political executives to focus on consensus—building and conflict—minimization by and within the executive. Specifically, I invite proposals on three major groups of questions.

1. How do political executives build external support to achieve their principal objectives? How do they structure their own advisory systems and internal decision-making and action-forcing processes to formulate, coordinate, articulate, and implement public policy? How do they use their public visibility, their symbolic and ceremonial functions, and their media-related activities to enhance

their political stature and satisfy the psychological dimensions of their office?

2. What is the impact of different forms and modes of organizing power? How does the organization of power affect its exercise? Has institutional tinkering, public and congressional liaison, political rhetoric, and/or symbolic actions enhanced the executive's ability to achieve objectives? Have such actions merely satisfied and extended performance expectations? Has the organization of power in previous administrations influenced transition planning start-up structures and strategies, and the cycling of policy goals in the current administration?

3. What prescriptions for organizing power do those who have held office offer? If practitioners had to do it all over again, what changes would they make and why? Why, for instance, do ex-presidents seem recently to have supported the idea of a six-year, non-renewable term, to the nearly-unanimous opposition of political scientists? Discussions with past and present executive officials might shed light on this question as well.

Proposals for papers, panels, roundtables, and workshops on these and related topics are welcome. Please let me know if you wish to write a panel, chair and organize a panel, or be a discussant. Graduate students and recent Ph.D.s in particular are encouraged to participate. I would also welcome comparativists and students of public administration to help us broaden our understanding of how political executives organize and exercise power.

Section 16. Organizations and Administration. Patricia W. Ingraham, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210.

This section will discuss not only the meeting's major theme, "The Organization of Power," but also its corollary, the power of organization. Thus, the primary focus of this section will be on those organizational processes that relate to the creation, acquisition, and use of public bureaucratic power. In that context many topics and types of analyses will be appropriate, but proposals will be

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most welcome in three areas: (1) patterns of bureaucratic influence and power in public policy processes and outcomes; (2) bureaucratic power within the context of democratic theory; and (3) the relationships between the organization and use of bureaucratic power and the definition and pursuit of the public interest.

Proposals reflecting important empirical research are encouraged; agency and/or policy specific case studies will also be useful provided they are presented in a framework that permits wider discussion and application.

To allow for coherent presentations, as well as audience discussion at the annual meeting, panel organizers should limit the number of papers proposed for each panel to three. The use of multiple discussants will be discouraged.

Section 17. Federalism and Subnational Politics. Thad L. Beyle, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

This section will focus the conference theme, "The Organization of Power," on questions relating to federalism and subnational politics. Panels will be selected that explore a variety of analyses and viewpoints on how power is or is not organized in the states and their substate units and what this can mean for the changing roles of the levels of government and politics in our federal system.

Possible subjects for panels and papers can range from the constitutional (separation of powers and home rule); to the institutional (governors vs. legislators and mayors vs. councils); to the political (culture, interest groups, PACs and parties); to processes (redistricting, budgeting and planning); to policies (taxation, regulation, education). Also of interest are possible panels on the role of political money, the media, and intergovernmental relations and organizations.

Suggestions for panel topics as well as roundtables or workshops should be justified in terms of their theoretical importance, relationship to ongoing research in the field, and the overall conference theme, "The Organization of Power." Paper volunteers should include a clear

statement of the topic they will be investigating, preliminary hypotheses tested, units of analysis, and the theoretical and methodological approaches. Discussant volunteers should include a description of their research interests and qualifications.

Section 18. Politics and Economics. Stephen Elkin, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

The study of political economy is built on the premise that economy and polity are powerfully interconnected. The proper understanding and evaluation of political life cannot proceed without similar study of economic life. (Correlatively, there are at least some who maintain that the proper understanding and evaluation of economic life cannot be achieved without a deeper understanding of political life.) Political economy then takes as its underlying purpose the study of whole regimes, how they work and how they may be made to work better. In its contemplation of reform, political economy joins hands with political philosophy.

In keeping with the preceding remarks and with the program theme of "The Organization of Power," I am particularly anxious to receive proposals for panels and papers that have both empirical and normative elements. Proposals which consider present and past interconnections between polity and economy are welcome, but especially encouraged are those that combine such empirical analyses with how the interconnections between economy and polity ought to be organized. In this vein, proposals that consider the manner in which a market society impedes or enhances popular control of authority will be particularly welcome. I also want to encourage proposals by those interested in the political economy of the good society. More specific topics might include: the political role of the business corporation in democratic political orders; the political business cycle and its consequences of popular control of authority; the relation between economic and political democracy; the interconnections between popular control of authority and a country's competitive position in the international

balance of trade; and the long-term prospects of the mixed regime of market capitalism and popular control.

Section 19. The Future of the Social (Welfare) State. Charles V. Hamilton, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.

The panels in this section will be concerned with the will and the power of states and societies in providing social protection benefits for their constituents. In the process of examining the causes and consequences of "welfare-state" developments in different societies, attention will be given to current and projected trends and to the implications for public policy. Most industrial nations are struggling to meet the needs of their people while facing increasing limitations on their resources. Neither budget-cutting nor program tinkering satisfactorily addresses the long-term problems confronting the United States and other "welfare states." People across the political spectrum believe we need to reexamine the basic premises of current social programs and then fashion an equitable and manageable system of social protection for future generations.

Consideration of these issues would call for panels addressing (1) underlying values of democracy in relation to the question: who should be helped? (2) issues of programmatic substance and administrative structures in responding to: what sort of assistance—delivered by whom—ought to be provided; as well as (3) economic concerns in terms of how to pay for the social protection benefits. Clearly, the role of the private sector has to be considered.

Within these three broad categories, panels are encouraged to address the topic in a variety of ways: historically, comparatively, demographically, but, hopefully, always focusing on long-term future policy options. In addition, papers that deal with the impact of international economic developments on domestic social policy are welcome.

Section 20. Public Policy Analysis. Don E. Kash, Science and Public Policy Program, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019.

The panels in this section will be selected with an eye to representing the most innovative work in the policy analysis area. In particular, I invite proposals which focus on the policy process, theoretical considerations, and specific substantive areas of policy.

I would like to encourage panel participation by academics, researchers from policy research organizations, and political scientists who are actively involved in the making and implementation of policy. With regard to the substantively oriented panels, I would find it particularly attractive to have panels which focus on current and future policy issues. In this connection, I would like to encourage papers which carry the substantive analyses to the point where particular policy recommendations are made. Please include as a part of your proposal a brief narrative statement of the goals of the panel and how the panel relates to work going on within the policy analysis field.

Section 21. International Relations: National Security and Conflict Analysis.

Catherine M. Kelleher, National Security Concentration, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742; Janice Gross Stein, University of Toronto.

Panels in this section will emphasize the significance of the ways in which power has been organized, applied, and constrained in the postwar search for security. Of particular interest will be papers examining the dynamics of conventional and nuclear deterrence; the relationship of military, economic, and diplomatic power to specific conflict outcomes; the predominant patterns in resource allocation in hot peace and cold conflict; and the role of perceptual and process variables in the effective organization/restraint of power. Proposals may cross system levels or time, and should deal with questions of enduring theoretical or policy interest. To ensure critical interchange, panels will be kept small, and panelists encouraged to adhere strictly to the schedule for submission of finished papers prior to the Washington meeting.

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Section 22. International Relations: Global Political Economy. Jeffrey A. Hart, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, DC 20510 (until 5/1/86); 3305 Camalier Drive, Chevy Chase, MD 20815 (5/1/86-7/1/86); Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 (after 7/1/86).

Recent work on global political economy has focused on three areas: (1) describing international challenges to state-society relations within the nation-state, (2) comparing and explaining differences in foreign economic policies across nation-states, and (3) describing and explaining changes in international economic regimes. In all three areas, the explanatory significance of the organization and distribution of power in the international system has been raised as a central theoretical question. A thorough reexamination of the role of power in global political economy should be a major theme of this year's meeting.

One very important question, stated most directly in a recent article in *International Organization* by Bruce Russett, is the accuracy of the oft-asserted proposition that U.S. political and economic hegemony began to erode in the early 1970s (and continues to do so).

Another key question is the impact of increased competition in world markets on national defense/security policies and *vice versa*. To what extent has competition increased because of declining hegemony? Are there other possible explanations for increased competition? Several scholars have pointed out the tendency of the United States and a few other countries to react to increased competition by raising defense spending, especially in areas likely to benefit specific industries (and especially high technology industries). Will the U.S. be able to reassert its military and economic hegemony by these means? There is also a growing literature on the use of defense spending to increase overall investment and growth. A critical survey of the growing literature on "military Keynesianism" might be another theme for this year's meeting.

In the area of foreign economic policy,

one crucial question has always been that of protectionism. Will there continue to be reductions in trade barriers through multilateral trade diplomacy, or does the current trend toward increased use of nontariff barriers presage a return to a less open world economy? The focus of international economic diplomacy increasingly has been on domestic measures not considered to be under the purview of multilateral agreements: e.g., tax incentives, preferential credit arrangements public procurement policies, R and D subsidies, antitrust/competition regulation, and corporatistic bargaining arrangements. The United States claims that its major trade partners engage in "targeting" and "industrial policies" prejudicial to U.S. firms. The other industrialized countries accuse the United States of engaging in unilateralism and extraterritoriality in recent trade disputes. Since 1986 is likely to be the year in which new multilateral trade talks are begun, it would be appropriate to have at least one panel devoted to a review of the international economic policies of the major trading countries, the newly industrializing, and the other developing countries. The relation of the global trade regime to the pursuit of New International Economic Order goals should also be examined.

Finally, many scholars and practitioners seem to believe that the international financial system is in a potential state of crisis due to the debt repayment problems of several large debtors (both in the form of developing countries like Brazil and Mexico, but also in the form of large but unprofitable enterprises). Bank crises and failures can undermine confidence in the world financial system. What are the origins of this situation and what are the prospects of change?

In the interest of making panels more interesting, I would like to see a few proposals for roundtables (discussions without papers) and for panels in which there is a decidedly dialectical flavor (papers and counterpapers, or critical discussions of a single scholarly work).

Section 23. International Relations: Interdependence, Organization and Power in the International Year of

Peace. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Political Science Department, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115.

The section will depart from the fact that 1986 has been designated "the international year of peace" to explore the contributions of emergent scholarship to understanding the roles of international institutions in ordering relations among states in varied conditions of autonomy and interdependence.

Forty years experience with international institutions since World War II has resulted in the contemporary paradox that the relations of states with and in international organizations have never been more turbulent while scholarly interest in these phenomena seems resurgent. In the domain of scholarship there prevails a pluralism which may appear healthy to some and chaotic to others. Explanations are sought in approaches which, however labelled, emphasize hierarchical power and leadership, power as authoritative allocation of values, interest aggregation, communication and "learning" processes. Focus wavers between substantive consequences and procedural behaviors. The intellectual structure and the empirical equipment for evaluation remain underdeveloped.

The section, therefore, will seek to elicit comparative evaluations of the roles of international institutions in the organization of power to effect desired outcomes. Scope is thus allowed for comparisons of: the analytical rationales, contributions and limitations for competing scholars or approaches; global and less than global institutional responses to international problems; empirically supported evaluations of organization achievements in dealing with different functions, or the same functions in different ways; organizations and procedures; influence of and upon actors. Permutations on the theme are invited.

Section 24. International Politics: Distributions of International Power. A. F. K. Organski, Center for Political Studies, Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106.

To answer the most important questions in the field of international politics one

must know at least two pieces of information: actors' intentions and actors' capabilities. Panels in this section of the international relations program will present research concerned with these two areas.

We are interested in new ideas, and estimating procedures that will help illumine the way actors' intentions are translated into foreign policy decisions are made. We are particularly interested in attempts to model this process.

Our second focus will be on the study of the capabilities of national systems. Panels will focus on issues arising from the distributions of nuclear and non-nuclear power that undergird the operation of systems in both Communist and non-Communist international orders. The panels will seek to present up-to-date conceptions of estimating these distribution changes that should be expected, and the effects of changes in the working of the international order.

In regard to the non-nuclear component of national capabilities, research on changes in the capabilities of the members of the system will be of particular interest. Such changes may be due to:

1. Shifts in the capacity of political systems to mobilize resources. There would be interest in research that deals with changes in the capacity of political systems to mobilize resources.
2. The increase in the capacities of a country increased through resource transfers from another country. This section will present research that addresses the issue of the role of aid in international affairs. How effective are economic or military or other transfers in improving the recipient's capabilities? Again, what effects does the transfer of resources have on the preferences of the recipients? How can one model the effects of the transfer of resources?
3. Changes in alignments and alliances due to members' "switches." How does that process come about? How do countries "change their minds"? What best ways are there to model the process?

On the nuclear side we are interested in exploring distributions of nuclear power and the effects that expected changes in

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the distribution will have on the stability and operation of the systems they help support. Panels in this portion of the program should address such questions as: the patterns of nuclear proliferation, the effects of the Strategic Defense Initiative of the U.S. government on the operation of the nuclear order, etc. In the case of the latter, it is hoped to present new work not only on the evaluations of the operation of that program on the position of the superpowers, but, also, and very important, on what will be the effects of "mutual assured defense" if successful-

ly established, on the present structure of international power (e.g., how will NATO be affected? How will U.S.-Chinese relations be affected, etc.). In the fray over the program this very important question has been largely overlooked.

The suggestions above are only illustrative and are not meant to exclude other ideas and research on the structure of international power, changes in that structure and the effect of changes on the stability and operation of the system. □

Nominations Sought for 1986 APSA Awards

Nominations are invited for the APSA awards to be presented at the 1986 annual meeting in Washington, DC. Dissertations must be nominated by departments and sent to the Association office by **January 15, 1986**. Books must be nominated by the publisher and copies sent by **February 1, 1986** to the national office and to members of the award committees. Members of the Association are invited to nominate individuals for the career awards. Further details may be obtained by writing to the national office.